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This thesis consists of three essays on public policy in the macroeconomy.
Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors quantitatively inves-
tigates the interaction between the ￿rms￿choice to operate in the formal or the
informal sector and government policy on taxation and enforcement. Informality
is here de￿ned as unregistered ￿rms in legal activities. Quantitative theory is de-
veloped, in general equilibrium, using the main determinants of informality: taxes,
enforcement, and regulation. These features are incorporated in a model of hetero-
geneous ￿rms, where ￿rms di⁄er in their productivities. A static version of Ghironi
and Melitz￿ s (2005) industry model is used to show that ￿rms with lower productiv-
ity endogenously choose to operate in the informal sector. I use cross-country data
on taxes, measures of informality, and measures of regulation (entry and compliance
costs, red tape, etc) to back out how high the enforcement levels must be country by
country to make the theory match the data. The model quantitatively accounts for
the keys aspects in the data and allows me to back out country-speci￿c enforcement
levels. Some policy reforms on taxation and enforcement are analyzed. The result is
that the welfare gains can be fairly large. I compute the shadow value of decreasing
regulation and perform some counterfactual experiments. I ￿nd that welfare gains
from reducing regulation are almost twice those computed for the policy reform.
Finally, distortions associated with informality account for a factor of 1.5 of the
output per capita di⁄erence between the richest and the poorest countries.
Determinants of Capital Intensive and R&D Intensive Foreign Direct Investment
studies the determinants of capital intensity and technology content of foreign direct
investment, an important economic driving force for developing countries. For this
purpose, we use sectoral industry data on U.S. foreign investment abroad, and data
on host countries￿institutional characteristics, like investment climate, protection of
property rights, labor standards and constitutional arrangements. Our regressions
show that better protection of property rights has a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on
R&D but not on capital intensive capital ￿ ows. There is evidence that an increase
in workers￿bargaining power results in a reduction of capital and technologically
intensive foreign investment. And although the evidence with respect to constitu-
tional arrangements is not very strong, presidential regimes appear to be less able
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than parliamentary ones to deliver policies attracting R&D intensive capital ￿ ows.
This is consistent with recent research on the e⁄ects of constitutional arrangements
on economic growth.
Ambiguity Aversion, the Equity Premium, and the Welfare Costs of Business
Cycles examines the potential importance of consumer ambiguity aversion for asset
prices and how consumption ￿ uctuations in￿ uence consumer welfare. First, consid-
ering a simple Mehra-Prescott-style endowment economy with a representative agent
facing consumption ￿ uctuations calibrated to match U.S. data, we study to what
extent ambiguity aversion can deliver asset prices that are consistent with data: a
high return on equity and a low return on riskfree bonds. For some con￿gurations
of preference parameters￿ a discount factor, a degree of relative risk aversion, and a
measure of ambiguity aversion￿ we ￿nd that it can. Then, we use these parameter
con￿gurations to investigate how much consumers would be willing to pay to reduce
endowment ￿ uctuations to zero, thus delivering a Lucas-style welfare cost of ￿ uc-
tuations. These costs turn out to be very large: consumers are willing to pay over
10% of consumption in permanent terms.Aos meus pais
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Introduction
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on public policy in the macro-
economy. The ￿rst two papers address important questions related to development
policy, speci￿cally, about the phenomenon of informality and the attraction of for-
eign direct investments (FDI). The last paper is about the welfare costs of business
cycles.
In recent years, informality has increased not only in developing countries, but
also in Europe and the US, according to estimates by Schneider (2006). More-
over, informal production is a major component of economic activities in developing
economies and therefore a subject of great importance in the public policy debates
in these countries. The ￿rst essay in this thesis contributes to those debates.
As one of the ways of promoting long-term growth, governments, particularly
in developing countries, try to attract foreign direct investments. The second essay
studies the host countries￿characteristics for attracting those highly technologically
and capital intensive investments.
A third policy question analyzed in this thesis is what can be done to eliminate
undesirable ￿ uctuations in economic activity. In order to be able to better evaluate
di⁄erent government policies aimed at smoothing business cycles, we ask what are
the welfare costs of economic ￿ uctuations in an economy populated by agents with
ambiguity aversion, a type of non-standard preference.
The main theme of this thesis is to quantitatively assess some aspects of public
macroeconomic policy. Below, I proceed to summarize each of the individual essays.
Chapter 2 (Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors) quantita-
tively investigates the interaction between the ￿rms￿choice to operate in the formal
or the informal sector and the government policy on taxation and enforcement.
Informality, in this essay, is de￿ned as unregistered ￿rms in legal activities.
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Quantitative theory is developed, in general equilibrium, using the main de-
terminants of informality: taxes, enforcement, and regulation. These features are
incorporated in a model of heterogeneous ￿rms, where ￿rms di⁄er in their productiv-
ities. A static version of Ghironi and Melitz￿ s (2005) industry model is used to show
that ￿rms with lower productivity endogenously choose to operate in the informal
sector.
I use cross-country data on taxes, measures of informality, and measures of reg-
ulation (entry and compliance costs, red tape, etc) to back out how high the en-
forcement levels must be country by country to make the theory match the data.
The model quantitatively accounts for the key aspects in the data and allows me to
back out country-speci￿c enforcement levels.
Some policy reforms on taxation and enforcement are analyzed. The result is
that the welfare gains can be fairly large. I compute the shadow value of decreasing
regulation and perform some counterfactual experiments. Thus, I ￿nd that the
welfare gains from reducing regulation are almost twice those computed for the
policy reform. Finally, distortions associated with informality account for a factor of
1.5 of the output per capita di⁄erence between the richest and the poorest countries.
Chapter 3 (Determinants of Capital Intensive and R&D Intensive Foreign Direct
Investment) studies the determinants of capital intensity and technology content
of foreign direct investment. For this purpose, we use sectoral industry data on
U.S. foreign investment abroad and data on host countries￿institutional character-
istics, like investment climate, protection of property rights, labor standards and
constitutional arrangements.
Capital ￿ ows have increased spectacularly in the last two decades. In particular,
foreign direct investment (FDI) has been growing three times as fast as total invest-
ment between 1980 and 2000. Over this period, there has also been a change in the
nature of FDI ￿ owing to developing countries. Previously, foreign investment was
concentrated to the extraction of natural resources for shipment abroad. Nowadays,
as developing countries become wealthier, investment diversi￿es into production of
consumer goods for their local markets. The increasing size and variety of these ￿ ows
has made both economists and policy makers interested in understanding their de-
terminants and e⁄ects. Research, on the one hand, tries to understand how FDI
a⁄ects productivity and growth, or income inequality and the environment. On the
other hand, many studies try to pinpoint the host and source country and industry
characteristics behind FDI ￿ ows.Chapter 1. Introduction 3
A question of interest among developing countries is what policies are better
at atracting much needed capital and new technologies. A number of studies has
found that institutional quality to be a positive determinant of FDI (and thus, in
particular, corruption has a negative e⁄ect), higher taxation reduces capital ￿ ows,
and more protection of intellectual property rights attracts high-tech investment.
The data shows mixed results on other dimensions of policy. For example, Rodrik
(1996) found that countries with higher labor standards attract more FDI, an e⁄ect
that seems to disappear when controlling for political risk (see Cho (2003)). And
measures of labor costs and workers bargaing power are found to have a negative
e⁄ect on FDI (Smarzynska and Spatareanu (2004) and Cooke (1997)).
Our regressions show that better protection of property rights has a signi￿cant
positive e⁄ect on R&D, but not on capital intensive capital ￿ ows. There is evidence
that an increase in workers￿bargaining power results in a reduction of capital and
technologically intensive foreign investment. And although the evidence with respect
to constitutional arrangements is not very strong, presidential regimes appear to
be less able than parliamentary ones to deliver policies attracting R&D intensive
capital ￿ ows. This is consistent with recent research on the e⁄ects of constitutional
arrangements on economic growth.
Chapter 4 (Ambiguity Aversion, the Equity Premium, and the Welfare Costs of
Business Cycles) examines the potential importance of consumers￿ambiguity aver-
sion for how consumption ￿ uctuations in￿ uence consumer welfare. Ambiguity aver-
sion, which is a way of formalizing preferences that are consistent with the Ellsberg
paradox, captures a form of violation of Savage￿ s axioms of subjective probability.
Instead, consumers behave as if a range of probability distributions is possible and as
if they are averse toward the "unknown". With the typical parameterized represen-
tation of ambiguity aversion, consumers have minmax preferences, thus maximizing
utility based on the worst possible belief. Thus, in an economy with a small amount
of randomness, there are ￿rst-order e⁄ects on utility if there is ambiguity about this
randomness. Thus, ambiguity aversion is in contrast to the standard model, where
risk aversion leads to second-order e⁄ects on utility.
We ￿rst consider a simple Mehra-Prescott-style endowment economy with a rep-
resentative agent facing consumption ￿ uctuations calibrated to match U.S. data.
Thus, we study to what extent ambiguity aversion can deliver asset prices that are
consistent with data: a high return on equity and a low return on riskfree bonds. For
some con￿gurations of preference parameters￿ a discount factor, a degree of relative
risk aversion, and a measure of ambiguity aversion￿ we ￿nd that it can. Then, we4 Chapter 1. Introduction
then use these parameter con￿gurations to investigate how much consumers would
be willing to pay to reduce endowment ￿ uctuations to zero, thus delivering a Lucas-
style welfare cost of ￿ uctuations. These costs turn out to be very large: consumers
are willing to pay over 10% of consumption in permanent terms.Bibliography
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The aim of this essay is to quantitatively investigate the interaction between ￿rms￿
choice to operate in the informal sector and government policy on taxation and
enforcement, given a country￿ s institutional characteristics and regulation. I follow
Schneider and Enste (2000) in de￿ning informality as "unreported income from the
production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter transactions,
hence all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to
the tax authorities". Emphasis here should be given to the fact I am only considering
legal activities, even though the non-compliance with taxes and regulations or the
lack of proper registration (when mandatory) would typify them as illegal. The size
of the informal sector1 measures the value of the production under informality. In
recent years, informality has not only increased in developing countries, but also in
Europe and the US, according to estimates by Schneider (2006). Moreover, informal
￿ I thank my supervisor, Per Krusell, for helpful comments and suggestions, and continuous
support. I am grateful for comments by Anders Fredriksson, Nicola Gennaioli, John Hassler,
Martin Bech Holte, Byeongju Jeong, Ethan Kaplan, Emanuel Kohlscheen, Dirk Niepelt, Laudo
Ogura, Stephen Parente, Torsten Persson, Kjetil Storesletten, and participants in seminars and
conferences at CERGE-EI, Swiss National Bank, IMT Lucca, Singapore Management University,
SITE, IIES, the University of Oslo, the 2006 Villa Mondragone workshop, and the 2006 North
American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society. I am thankful to Christina L￿nnblad
for editorial assistance. Financial support from Jan Wallander￿ s and Tom Hedelius￿ Research
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are, of course, mine.
1 Throughout this essay, I interchangeably use the terms: "informal economy", "shadow econ-
omy", "underground economy", "grey economy", including its variants with "sector", instead of
"economy", as referring to the same concept.
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production is a major component of economic activities in developing economies
and therefore a subject of great importance in the public policy debates in these
countries. Thus, this essay also contributes to those debates.
The consequences of informality include, but are not limited to, two main prob-
lems concerning the government and the ￿rms. The ￿rst is a ￿scal one. Assuming
the existence of public expenditures to be ￿nanced from tax collection, a smaller tax
base implies a higher tax burden on formal ￿rms. The second consequence implies
that ￿rms in the informal sector have no or less access to the courts of law. Moreover,
they may be infringing regulatory, labor-market and product-market obligations. I
take the view that most of these obligations or regulations are socially ine¢ cient.2
Therefore, I consider low regulation as an indicator of a country￿ s institutional qual-
ity. Making a parallel to what Djankov et al (2002) name the "tollbooth" view of
the public choice theory of regulation, countries with better institutional quality are
those where bureaucrats are less able to extract rents or bribes through ine¢ cient
regulation.3
Traditionally, taxation has been blamed for the size of the informal sector. How-
ever, it cannot explain the full extent of the phenomenon of informality. An explana-
tion should also rely on the monitoring or enforcement against ￿rms in the informal
sector, and on regulation or institutional quality.4 Hernando de Soto￿ s The Other
Path (1989) is very vocal about this new strand of literature. Following de Soto￿ s
work, many papers have attempted to qualitatively explain those mechanisms in-
volved in the determination of informal economies. However, few have quanti￿ed
the e⁄ects.5 In this essay, I develop quantitative theory using those main deter-
minants of informality. In doing so, I am also able to analyze general equilibrium
e⁄ects. My speci￿c interest is in analyzing the elasticity of informality with respect
to enforcement, taxation and regulation. I also perform some policy reforms, under
2 Farrell (2004) gives a more detailed description of these regulations. Among them, there are
some that are socially-e¢ cient. Those socially-e¢ cient regulations can be considered as the bene￿ts
of formality in an economy.
3 The government in my model can be interpreted ￿ la Banerjee (1997), where there is a con￿ ict
of interest between the government and bureaucrats. The government maximizes household￿ s
utility at the same time as bureaucrats want to use red tape (or bad regulation).
4 Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) compare di⁄erent views and dismiss
the taxation view.
5 Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006) and Fortin, Marceau and Savard (1997) are among those few.
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a public ￿nance perspective, exploring these elasticities.
Before presenting the model, I brie￿ y review the literature on informality. As
mentioned before, the informal economy is the subject of a vast literature. A thor-
ough review of this literature can be found in Schneider and Enste (2000).6 Rausch
(1991), followed by Fortin, Marceau and Savard (1997), Amaral and Quintin (2006),
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006), Paula and Scheinkman (2006) and many others,
analyze informal economies using the "span of control" model of Lucas (1978). In
these models, agents are heterogeneous in their managerial abilities.7 In an alterna-
tive approach, I model ￿rms with di⁄erent productivities. Since my focus is not on
occupational choice, a model with ￿rms seems more appropriate. Fortin, Marceau
and Savard (1997) and Sarte (2000) model ￿rms closely to the model in the cur-
rent work. However, the ￿rst paper considers a homogeneous good (while I have
di⁄erentiated ones), while Sarte (2000) considers both informal and formal ￿rms,
equally dividing the production in a speci￿c industry. In my model, a ￿rm with
productivity z produces a corresponding di⁄erentiated variety z and all ￿rms with
the same productivity level are in the same sector (formal or informal).
Rausch (1991) was probably the ￿rst to formally model the informal sector.
However, he resorts to a minimum wage policy for large ￿rms in order to create the
informal sector. In Fortin, Marceau and Savard (1997), there is also a minimum
wage. My model creates informality without resorting to minimum wage and still
smaller ￿rms endogenously choose to become informal. Azuma and Grossman (2003)
provide a theoretical model of the informal sector where informality exists because
￿rms￿productive endowments are not perfectly observable. Then, the government
cannot optimally extract resources from ￿rms.
The model presented here does not focus on tax evasion per se but, naturally,
when a ￿rm is in the informal sector, it is evading taxes. A huge literature has dealt
with tax evasion. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) is the paper which ￿rst modeled
tax evasion. Andreoni, Erard and Feldstein (1998) and Niepelt (2005) are recent
contributions in the area.
I consider an economy which consists of two sectors: a formal and an infor-
mal one. The sectors are structured in monopolistic competition ￿ la Dixit-Stiglitz,
6 An even more recent survey of the literature can be found in Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006).
7 In the case of Fortin, Marceau and Savard (1997), the agents are, in fact, ￿rms with di⁄erent
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with heterogeneous ￿rms which draw a productivity level from some given proba-
bility distribution. There are no ￿rms with di⁄erent productivities producing the
same variety or di⁄erent goods being produced by ￿rms with equal productivity.
The model of monopolistic competition implies that the representative household
consumes all varieties. My modeling strategy closely follows the static version of
the industry model of Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Melitz (2003), both based on
Hopenhayn (1992).
There exists a ￿xed regulation cost ￿ in the formal sector.8 Further, ￿rms in
the formal sector also pay a proportional tax on production at a constant rate ￿.
Another choice for the ￿rm is to operate in the informal sector. In this case,
there is no ￿xed cost. However, there is an enforcement cost proportional to out-
put. This cost is the result of the probability of being caught in informality and
the corresponding ￿ne (or punishment). Fortin, Marceau and Savard￿ s (1997) inter-
pretation of this kind of cost is that ￿rms engage in some costly activity to avoid
being caught and pay the penalty. It is assumed that ￿rms are better o⁄paying the
cost than risking being caught. I model this enforcement mechanism as a constant
rate e on the total production of informal ￿rms. A third interpretation is that the
enforcement technology of the government destroys a fraction e of the output of
informal ￿rms. Table 2.1 summarizes the costs faced by ￿rms in each sector.
Table 2.1: Taxes and costs associated with economic activities
Formal Sector Informal Sector
Regulation/Compliance cost ￿ 0
Tax rate ￿ 0
Enforcement rate 0 e
The government relies on taxation on formal businesses and the net revenue from
enforcement. It spends its revenue on exogenous government expenditures and on
the costs of enforcing informal ￿rms. The formal sector contributes to revenue, but
generates a waste in the economy, due to regulation. Thus, regulation creates a
distortion in the formal sector. Since government expenditures are given, a smaller
formal sector would increase the tax burden on formal ￿rms. At the same time,
enforcement reduces informality, but is costly, thereby creating another distortion
8 We may interpret ￿ as a cost of complying with the formal sector, e.g. set-up costs, registration
costs and resources spent on paper work.Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 11
in the economy. The government task is to balance these distortions on the two
sectors and raise enough revenue to ￿nance its expenditures.
I use cross-country data on taxes, measures of informality, and measures of reg-
ulation (entry and compliance costs, red tape, etc) to back out how high the en-
forcement levels must be country by country to make the theory match the data.
The main output of this quantitative exercise consists of three things: ￿rst, the
measures of enforcement can be compared with (indirect) measures of enforcement
di⁄erences across countries, as a sort of "test" of the model. Second, I can ask a set
of quantitative public-￿nance questions, for example concerning policy reforms on
taxation and enforcement rates and the shadow dead-weight-loss of regulation costs.
Third, I can use the model to account for how much informality reduces output per
capita across countries.
The model quantitatively accounts for the degree of informality and other key
aspects, such as size of government and regulation costs. The computed enforcement
positively correlates with measures of tax compliance. Moreover, enforcement is
positively correlated with regulation and government expenditures and, as expected,
it is negatively correlated with the size of the informal sector. There is some scope
for policy reforms (using e and ￿ as instruments). In general, most countries would
do better to decrease informality, although some would bene￿t from increasing it.
In both cases, the welfare gains can be fairly large. Countries bene￿ting the most
are those with lower regulation costs. This suggests that reducing regulation costs is
a more e⁄ective policy for increasing private consumption and reducing informality.
In particular, since regulation is a distortion in the formal sector, it should be zero.
However, the model here takes regulation as given and its determination are outside
the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, the model allows us to measure what countries
would gain from decreasing regulation (￿). This is done by computing the shadow
value of decreasing regulation. Thus, we do not know how much it would cost to
allow this decrease, but the model allows us to compute the bene￿ts. Finally, I
perform some counterfactual experiments by reducing the regulation costs. As a by-
product of the model, I can account for how much the distortions associated with
informality reduce output per capita across countries. I found that these distortions
account for a factor of 1.5 of the output per capita di⁄erence between the richest
and the poorest countries.12 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a discussion about
the relationship between regulation cost and informality. Section 3 presents the
model, the de￿nition and the characterization of equilibrium as well as some com-
parative statics. The following section brings the baseline calibration and the quan-
titative assessment of the model. Section 5 considers some policy reforms. First, I
analyze the reallocation of taxes and enforcement and second, the shadow value of
regulation and a counterfactual experiment are analyzed. In section 6, the model
accounts for income di⁄erences across countries. Some concluding remarks are pre-
sented in section 7.
2 Regulation cost and informality
In this section, I focus on the relationship between regulation cost and informality.
The ￿rst objective is to gather data. Djankov et al (2002) present new data on
the regulation of entry for 85 countries. They calculate the o¢ cial costs and the
time legally required to begin operating a ￿rm in these countries. I refer to them
for detailed explanations of the procedures. They report both the monetary cost
for fees and the time spent. The ￿gure is measured as fraction of each country￿ s
per capita GDP. It seems that the data on per capita GDP from the World Bank￿ s
(2006) World Development Indicator dataset has su⁄ered some revisions after it was
￿rst released. Some of the changes in the per capita GDP data were substantial:
some countries had two-digit percentage point changes from the previous ￿gures.
Since I have an interest in using the best data available to perform the quanti-
tative assessment, I decided to recompute the total cost of regulation (fees + time)
using updated World Bank data on the countries￿per capita GDP in 1999 in cur-
rent US$. The new total costs and per capita GDP in 1999 ￿gures are shown in
table 2.2. Data on the size of the informal economy as a percentage of formal GDP
in 1999/2000, estimated by Schneider (2006), is also included in the table. I refer
to his paper for a detailed explanation of how the size of the informal economy is
estimated. In short, the informality is computed by indirect measures, like money
or electricity demand and latent estimation methods using the DYMIMIC (dynamic
multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model.
As can be noted from table 2.2, there is a large variation in the three variablesChapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 13
across the selected countries. Another point worth mentioning about these ￿gures
is that the size of the informal sector is non-trivial even in developed economies,
ranging between 8.6% and 25% of formal GDP. The correlation between per capita
GDP and the size of the informal sector is -0.67. Loayza (1996) reports a similar
correlation in his estimation of informality among Latin American countries. As a
matter of fact, it is possible to group the countries in the table into categories relative
to their level of informality, so as to observe similarities in the level of development
of countries in each category. The ￿rst category would include "low informality"
countries, with an informal sector of up to 15%. Examples of such countries are
Switzerland, the U.S. and Japan. A second category would be "medium informality"
countries with informal sectors of between 15% and 30%. Countries in this category
include, for example, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. The next category would group
countries with high informality (between 30% and 50%). These countries consist
of most of Latin America and some African and Asian countries. Finally, the last
category would be formed by those countries with very high informality, where the
informal sector is larger than the formal sector. These patological cases include very
poor economies in Africa and Asia.
Another factor, not shown in the table, but reported by Schneider (2006), is the
growth of the informal sector, occurring both in developing and developed economies.
A further relevant point is the correlation between the size of the informal sector (as
a percentage of the formal sector) and the regulation costs. Figure 2.1 can better
illustrate this point. The result is that higher regulation costs are associated with
larger sizes of the informal sector. The OLS regression coe¢ cient of this relationship
is 10.13 and it is signi￿cant at the 1% level.9
3 The model
3.1 Basics
Firms There is a continuum of ￿rms of measure 1. Each ￿rm produces a di⁄erenti-
ated good indexed by z 2 ￿. Firms are heterogeneous as they produce with di⁄erent
technologies, z, given by a distribution probability F(z) with support [zmin;1) and




















































































































Figure 2.1: Regulation costs and the size of the informal sector
zmin > 0. A ￿rm with productivity z produces ￿z units of output per unit of labor,
where ￿ is just a parameter (￿ can be interpreted as aggregate labor productivity).10
Productivity di⁄erences across ￿rms then translate into di⁄erences in the unit cost
of production (w=￿z). The production function can be written as
y(z) = ￿zl(z); (2.1)
where l(z) is the labor employed by the ￿rm with productivity z.
Firms can choose to operate in the formal or the informal sector. Producing in
the formal sector requires the payment of a (￿xed) regulation cost ￿ (measured in
terms of labor) and the payment of a proportional tax rate ￿ on the ￿rm￿ s total
output y(z). Firms in the informal sector pay a proportional enforcement tax e on
10 To clarify, z indexes both the ￿rm￿ s variety and its productivity. Therefore, a ￿rm with
productivity z produces a corresponding variety z:Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 15
their output. The pro￿t maximization problem of a ￿rm with productivity z is
max
p(z)
￿(z) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿IF ￿ eII)p(z)y(z) ￿ wl(z) ￿ IFw￿; (2.2)
where IJ is an indicator function that takes a value equal to 1 if the ￿rm is operating
in sector J = F;I (formal or informal, respectively).
Representative Household The economy is populated by a unit mass of atom-
istic households. The representative household owns all ￿rms and supplies L units
of labor inelastically in each period at real wage w. She maximizes the utility from
the composite household￿ s consumption (C) and the level of publicly provided goods
(G):




￿￿=(￿￿1), ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across
goods and c(z) is the household￿ s consumption of good z. G takes the same aggre-
gator form as C. Then, G ￿
￿R
z2￿ g(z)(￿￿1)=￿dz
￿￿=(￿￿1). The utility function u is
increasing in both arguments. The budget constraint of the representative household
is:
C ￿ wL + ￿F + ￿I: (2.4)
The household earns labor income wL plus the pro￿ts in the formal (￿F) and infor-
mal sectors (￿I). She spends her total income buying the composite consumption
C:
Government The government collects taxes and enforcement penalties. En-
forcement generates a revenue E ￿ eYI; however, there is a cost ￿(E) (with
￿0(E) > 0) to exert this enforcement. The government spends its net revenue on
the purchase of the publicly provided good G. The government budget constraint
is:
G + ￿(E) ￿ ￿YF + eYI; (2.5)
where YJ is total output in sector J.
Resource Constraint De￿ne Y as total output. Then, we can write the re-
source constraint of this economy as:
Y = YF + YI = C + G + ￿(E): (2.6)16 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
3.2 Prices and pro￿ts
Individual good demand Then, the individual demand for good z is y(z); such
that
y(z) = Y [pJ(z)]
￿￿ ; (2.7)
where pJ(z) is the price charged by a ￿rm with productivity z in sector J.11
Prices All ￿rms face a residual demand curve with constant elasticity ￿ in the
output market, and they set ￿ exible prices that re￿ ect the same proportional markup









The above price is derived from the ￿rms￿pro￿t maximization problem (2.2) subject
to individual demand (2.7). The derivation is in the appendix.






Prices in the formal sector are proportionally higher to those in the informal sector
if enforcement is lower or taxes are higher.
Pro￿ts Now that we have derived the equilibrium price, we can express the
pro￿t of a ￿rm with productivity z as:
￿J(z) =
(1 ￿ ￿IF ￿ eII)
￿
[pJ(z)]
1￿￿ Y ￿ IFw￿: (2.10)
This allows us to study how pro￿ts change with productivity
@￿J
@z





￿1 > 0: (2.11)
Since ￿ must be greater than 1 and so far as z ￿ 0, which I assume, pro￿ts are
monotonically increasing in productivity, as should be expected.
Now let us check the second derivative:
@2￿J
@z2 = (1 ￿ ￿IF ￿ eII)




￿2 R 0 if ￿ R 2: (2.12)
11 See the appendix for the derivation of individual demand.Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 17
The pro￿t function can be concave or convex in z, depending on the level of ￿, i.e.
the elasticity of substitution across goods. When goods are highly complementary
(1 < ￿ < 2), the function is concave with respect to z, whereas the pro￿t function
is convex when goods are more substitutable (￿ > 2).
3.3 De￿nition of equilibrium
Now that the model has been described, I proceed to de￿ne and verify the existence
of the equilibrium for exogenous policy. Before, let me state some assumptions. If
￿ = 0, the problem is trivial. There is a bang-bang solution, where all ￿rms choose
the formal (informal) sector if and only if e > (<) ￿: This can be seen more clearly
by checking the pro￿t expression in (2.2). To make the problem more interesting, I
assume that ￿ > 0:
Assumption 1 The regulation cost is positive, ￿ > 0:
The next proposition describes the conditions for equilibria in the model when
policy (e;￿) is exogenous.
Proposition 1 Given Assumption 1, for e ￿ ￿, all ￿rms operate in the informal
sector. For e > ￿ and a su¢ ciently small zmin ￿ 0; there exists a unique threshold
value z￿ 2 [zmin;1) such that ￿F(z￿) = ￿I(z￿), ￿rms with z < z￿ operate in the
informal sector, and ￿rms with z ￿ z￿ operate in the formal sector.
Proof. The ￿rst result of the proposition is quite trivial. If e ￿ ￿ and ￿ >
0, the pro￿t function for the informal sector is always above that for the formal
sector. Intuitively, if operating in the formal sector becomes too costly (a higher
proportional and ￿xed cost), then no ￿rm is willing to be formal. To prove the
second part of the proposition, for now assume zmin = 0. Then, we know that
￿F(0) = ￿w￿ < 0 (by Assumption 1) and ￿I(0) = 0. Thus, ￿F(0) < ￿I(0):
To prove the existence of a single crossing, I need to show that the slope of the
pro￿t function in the formal sector is higher than the slope of the function in the
informal sector. The slopes are given by the derivative
@￿J
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The last inequality is true i⁄ e > ￿; which we assume. Naturally, what is left is
to guarantee that z￿ ￿ zmin. We assume zmin to be su¢ ciently small, so that the
unique threshold always exists. In case zmin is not su¢ ciently small, then ￿F(zmin) ￿
￿I(zmin) and all ￿rms operate in the formal sector. In that case, z￿ = zmin and the
equilibrium is still unique.
The reason why we need the assumption that e > ￿ in the second part of the
proposition is quite straightforward. If the opposite occurs, the ￿rst part of the
proposition shows that no formal sector exists. The individual ￿rm faces a decision
to operate in the informal sector, paying an enforcement rate e, or to operate in the
formal sector, where not only the tax rate is higher, but there also exists a positive
￿xed cost on top. Clearly, it is not worth being formal.
The following plot illustrates the single crossing property described in Proposi-
tion 1.
Now, the de￿nition of the equilibrium follows:
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium with exogenous policy is a set of allocations of the
good fy(z)g and a productivity threshold z?, such that: (a) given exogenous gov-
ernment policy (￿;e) and wages w, ￿rms maximize pro￿t; (b) given prices (w;p(z))
and exogenous government policy (￿;e;G), the representative household maximizes
composite consumption C; (c) the budget constraint of the government holds with
equality; (d) markets (for both labor and goods) clear; and, ￿nally, (e) ￿rms with
productivity z < z￿ operate in the informal sector and ￿rms with z ￿ z￿ operate in
the formal sector.Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 19

















Figure 2.2: Single crossing property of the pro￿t curves
3.4 Parametrization of the productivity distribution
I parametrize the distribution of productivities following Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
They assume the distribution to be Pareto with lower bound zmin and shape para-
meter k > ￿ ￿1. Parameter k indexes the dispersion of productivity. The standard
deviation of log productivity is equal to 1=k. And the condition that k > ￿ ￿ 1 en-
sures that the variance in ￿rm size is ￿nite. The distribution of productivity, which
is Pareto, also induces the distribution of size of ￿rms to be Pareto. Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) claim that this distribution ￿ts ￿rm-level data for the U.S. quite well.
The cumulative distribution function is F(z) = 1 ￿ (zmin=z)k and the probability





Considering the threshold equilibrium described in Proposition 1, we can com-20 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors





and since there is a measure one of ￿rms, the number of ￿rms in the formal sector,
NF, equals (zmin=z￿)k:
3.5 Determination of equilibrium
This section shows the analytical solution of the equilibrium considering the para-
metrization of the productivity distribution given in the previous subsection. It is
enough to solve for only three endogenous variables to determine the equilibrium,
namely, the threshold of productivity z￿; the wage w, and total output Y . For this
purpose, we need three equilibrium conditions.
The ￿rst equilibrium condition is the cuto⁄condition ￿F(z￿)￿￿I(z￿) = 0, where












Substituting for the price equation (2.9) and after having done some algebra12 , we

















We can express the left-hand side as a function ￿1 of the threshold z￿. The right-
hand side is a simple function of the other two endogenous variables: w and Y .
Remember that I consider ￿ and e to be exogenous policy variables. Moreover, so
far, the equilibrium condition refers to the optimal choices of ￿rms, which take these
policies as given.
Another equilibrium condition to consider is the labor-market clearing, which is




dF(z) + ￿(1 ￿ F(z
￿)) = L: (2.18)
This condition can also be rewritten, in a similar fashion to (2.17), as follows:











































￿ ￿ 1 ￿ k
. The left-
hand side is expressed as a function ￿2 of the threshold z￿ and other exogenous
variables. And the right-hand side is expressed as a function of w and Y .
Now, notice that the two equations (2.17) and (2.19) have the same right-hand


























Finally, we need a third equilibrium condition which is given by the goods￿market






















￿ ￿ 1 ￿ k
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1 z￿￿￿k￿1
￿ ￿ 1 ￿ k
￿
(2.22)
Given z￿ (by equation 2.20), we can compute w using the above expression: And
given z￿ and w, we can compute Y , using either equations (2.17) or (2.19).22 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
3.6 Comparative Statics
The equilibrium conditions allow us to do some comparative statics with respect to
the fundamentals of the model. I summarize the results in the following subsubsec-
tions.
3.6.1 Tax rate ￿
An increase in the tax rate makes it more costly to operate in the formal sector.
At the margin, ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to switch to the informal sector, which leads
to an increase in z￿. The increase in taxes has two e⁄ects in the same direction,
thereby reducing wages. The ￿rst e⁄ect is the direct e⁄ect of taxes, thereby reducing
the demand for labor across sectors; the second e⁄ect is the movement of workers
from formal ￿rms to informal ones. Since informal ￿rms have lower productivity,
the marginal productivity of labor is reduced, as is the wage. For total output,
the increase in taxes has three e⁄ects: (1) the direct e⁄ect of the higher tax rate,
increasing Y thanks to less resources being wasted on the regulation cost ￿; (2) the
increase in z￿, reducing output; (3) the decrease in wages, further reducing output.
The net e⁄ect on total output is therefore ambiguous. In most of the cases I studied,
the ￿rst e⁄ect is larger than the sum of the last two; thus a higher Y as the tax rate
rises.
3.6.2 Enforcement rate e
Compared to the tax increase, raising the enforcement rate generates an opposite
e⁄ect. A higher e makes it more costly to operate in the informal sector, which
makes ￿rms on the margin switch to the formal sector, thereby decreasing z￿: Once
more, there are two e⁄ects on wages. While the ￿rst e⁄ect, which reduces demand
for labor, remains, the second e⁄ect is inverted, moving workers from informal to
formal ￿rms. The latter e⁄ect increases wages, since the marginal productivity of
labor is higher (formal ￿rms have higher productivity). This second e⁄ect is high for
countries with low regulation costs13 . If the ￿rst e⁄ect is higher, w(e) is decreasing
everywhere. If the ￿rst e⁄ect is higher for low levels of enforcement and lower after
13 In the model, ￿ works as a softener of the e⁄ects on productivity and it directly a⁄ects the
formal ￿rms, which are the more productive ones. Analytically, we￿ < 0:Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 23
some threshold e, then wages become U-shaped. As before, there are three separate
e⁄ects on total output. Analyzing the separate e⁄ects on output as e increases: (1)
the direct e⁄ect reduces Y , because of the distortionary e⁄ect of ￿; (2) a decrease
in z￿ increases output; and (3) there is an ambiguous e⁄ect on wages. If wages are
decreased, output drops. Instead, if wages increase, output also rises. In most of
the cases studied, the net e⁄ect on output is negative.
3.6.3 Regulation cost ￿
An increase in regulation works in the same line as an increase in taxes. The
threshold z￿ increases and wages go down. Once more, the e⁄ect on output is
ambiguous.
3.6.4 Elasticity of substitution across goods ￿
The increase in ￿ can be translated as an increase in competition, since the elasticity
of substitution determines the ￿rms￿markup over costs. Since there is a ￿xed cost
in the formal sector, formal ￿rms on the margin between being formal or informal
are hurt proportionally more than the informal ￿rms on the same margin. Then,
the marginal formal ￿rms switch to the informal sector, thus increasing z￿. The
increase in ￿ also means that the demand for goods becomes more elastic and there
is a strong increase in demand for goods with lower prices (i.e., for goods with higher
productivity). This shifts labor to high productivity ￿rms, which explains why there
is an increase in wages. Finally, the increase in wages raises total output.
3.6.5 Labor supply L
An increase in L makes all ￿rms hire more, but more jobs are proportionally created
in the formal (high productivity) sector, thereby increasing wages. More workers im-
ply more production. And, in fact, total output increases linearly with L. Informal
￿rms on the margin switch to the formal sector, thereby reducing z￿.
3.6.6 Total factor productivity ￿
In this model, parameter ￿, which represents total factor productivity in the econ-
omy, only works as a scale parameter. The production function is y(z) = ￿zl(z) and24 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors







Then, it increases total production and since it augments labor productivity,
there is an increase in wages. Since it is just a scale parameter, no e⁄ect on the
threshold z￿ is observed.
3.6.7 Lower bound for productivity zmin
An increase in the minimum productivity level shifts the distribution of ￿rm pro-
ductivity to the right. Clearly, marginal productivity of labor is higher and wages
increase. The e⁄ect on output is also positive. As zmin increases, the threshold z￿
also increases. However, the size of the informal sector as a percentage of formal
output remains constant.
3.6.8 Shape parameter k
Parameter k indexes the dispersion of productivity draws: dispersion decreases as
k increases, and the ￿rm productivity levels are increasingly concentrated toward
their lower bound, zmin. By de￿nition, an increase in k decreases the marginal
productivity of labor and wages go down. Since ￿rms are more concentrated towards
zmin, the threshold z￿ is reduced. The wage reduction implies that total output is
also lower.
4 Quantitative assessment
So far, we have studied the mechanisms qualitatively involved in the model. In this
section, I calibrate the model to 29 countries and make some quantitative experi-
ments. The countries chosen are the OECD countries plus Brazil. The reason for
using OECD countries is that the data on total government revenue is more uniform
and available and the ￿rms￿characteristics are more similar when I calibrate for the
distribution of productivities. Nonetheless, the cross-section of countries is quite
diverse, including both developed and emerging economies.Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 25
4.1 Solving the model
The model is solved as follows. This is the implementation of the equilibrium de-
scribed in subsection 3.5.
1. Given (zmin;￿;k;L;￿;e;￿), z￿ is computed. The TFP parameter ￿ does not
a⁄ect z￿.
2. Then, wage w and total output Y are calculated using equations (2.22) and
either (2.17) or (2.19). Here, ￿ is just a level parameter and does not a⁄ect
the results.
3. The size of the informal sector (INF) is the ratio of informal sector output






















k + 1 ￿ ￿
(2.24)
and








￿1￿￿ z￿￿￿k￿1 ￿ z
￿￿k￿1
min
￿ ￿ 1 ￿ k
: (2.25)
4. Per capita GDP is formal sector output YF divided by L.
5. The amount of labor employed in each sector is computed, respecting that the
labor market clearing condition LF + LI + ￿(zmin=z￿)
k ￿ L, where (zmin=z￿)
k
is the proportion of formal ￿rms in the economy.
6. Then, I calculate government expenditures as a percentage of formal GDP
(g ￿ G=YF).
4.2 Choosing the parameters
The parameters that need to be calibrated are: (1) productivity distribution para-
meters: zmin;k; (2) elasticity of substitution across goods, ￿; (3) regulation cost, ￿;
and (4) labor supply, L. The model also has two policy variables: ￿ and e, the tax
and enforcement rates, respectively.26 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
Table 2.3: General baseline calibration
Parameter Economic interpretation Value
zmin lowest productivity value 1
k parameter productivity distribution 3.4
￿ elasticity of substitution across goods 3.8
L labor supply 1
￿ total-factor productivity 1
The model period is the average life time of ￿rms. Since this is a static model,
it makes sense to consider a large time frame (about ten years). Following what
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) did, I use the value of ￿ from Bernard et al (2003). They
set ￿ = 3:8; which is calibrated to ￿t U.S. plant data. They report that the standard
deviation of log U.S. plant sales is 1.67. This standard deviation in the model is
equal to 1=(k ￿ ￿ + 1). The choice of ￿ implies that k = 3:4 (which satis￿es the
requirement that k > ￿ ￿ 1). Across all computations, I normalize the size of the
work force L to 1 and the lowest value of productivity zmin is also set to 1. Moreover,
the scale parameter ￿ (the "TFP") is set to 1 on the baseline calibration14 . The
cost of enforcement for the government is set equal to the revenue from enforcement,
￿(E) = E, so that the government only bene￿ts from taxation on formal ￿rms.
I match government expenditures, regulation cost and the size of the informal
sector by choosing ￿;e;￿. The data on government expenditures for OECD countries
is the total government revenue from OECD (2003). The data on Brazil￿ s total
government revenue comes from Central Bank of Brazil. The data on the size of
the informal sector is from Schneider (2006) and the data on regulation cost is from
Djankov et al (2002) and my own calculations (described in Section 2). However,
the calculated regulation cost is not exactly ￿. It is the monetary cost (of fees and
time) as a percentage of formal per capita GDP. Then, the relation between the








14 In Section 6, it is calibrated to di⁄erent values for each country when analyzing output per
capita di⁄erences among countries.Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 27
Therefore, the model is solved with a system of six non-linear equations to de-
termine six variables: z￿;Y;w;￿;e;￿. The six equations are: 2.17 (or 2.19), 2.20,
2.23, 2.25, 2.26, g = G=YF.
4.3 Baseline results
Table 2.4 brings the results for the baseline calibration. The data used in the cali-
bration is found in the ￿rst three columns: government expenditures as a percentage
of formal GDP, the size of the informal economy as a percentage of formal GDP and
the regulation cost. The next three columns give the results for tax and the ￿xed
cost on formal businesses and the enforcement rate on informal business for the 29
countries in the sample. The table is sorted by the enforcement rate. Countries
with lower enforcement rates are at the top of the table.
This baseline computation provides two results. The ￿rst is that I can match
key facts of the data for each country. The second result is the enforcement rates
that I backed out. This measure of enforcement can be compared with other (indi-
rect) measures of enforcement di⁄erences across countries, as a sort of "test" of the
model. The idea here is to check that the ￿gures I obtain are really measuring tax
enforcement. In lieu of better data, I constructed two measures of tax compliance
using data on sta¢ ng of government audit o¢ ces in OECD countries (OECD, 2004).
One measure is the ratio of total audit sta⁄and total population. The second is the
same ratio, but just considering the labor force in the denominator. Enforcement
is strongly positively correlated with these two measures. The correlations are 0.58
and 0.59, respectively15 . Figure 2.3 illustrates the relation between enforcement
and total audit personnel per population (in million).
The computed enforcement allows us to better understand its relationship with
the other variables in the model, namely, regulation, the tax rate and the size of the
informal sector. Take the case of Switzerland and the United States with similar
levels of informality. The U.S. have the smallest enforcement rate in the sample while
Switzerland has a large one. The di⁄erence between these two countries is that the
U.S. have much smaller regulation costs than Switzerland. The same can be said of
Austria as compared to the United States. Austria has the largest enforcement rate


























































Figure 2.3: Enforcement and total audit workers per capita
in the sample and a small level of informality, like the U.S. and Switzerland. But
since Austria has such high regulation costs (in the order of 20 times more), it needs
to enforce the informal sector to a considerably larger extent. Otherwise, it does not
create enough incentives to make ￿rms switch to the formal sector. At the other side
of the spectrum, consider countries with a large informal sector, like Brazil, Mexico
and Turkey. These countries have low enforcement, as would be expected. Another
point about why these countries can exert low enforcement is that taxation is not so
high, especially in the case of Mexico. Greece has the same level of informality and
the same amount of regulation cost as Mexico. However, these countries present
very di⁄erent enforcement levels. This is driven by the fact that Greece has more
than twice the level of government expenditures than Mexico.
Next, table 2.5 presents some OLS estimations using the computed enforcement
as a dependent variable. In column (1), we see that there is a positive correla-
tion between the regulation ￿xed cost (￿) and enforcement. However, the e⁄ect
is weak since other factors that are also relevant for endogenously determining the
enforcement rate are omitted. The next columns present the e⁄ect of regulation
on enforcement controlling for these other factors, namely the size of governmentChapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 29
Table 2.5: Relation of enforcement and regulation, informality, and government size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulation 0.097** 0.101*** 0.148*** 0.135***
(0.038) (0.022) (0.041) (0.022)




constant 0.446*** 0.145*** 0.521*** 0.215***
(0.025) (0.042) (0.039) (0.044)
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.73 0.29 0.79
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis: *signi￿cant at 10%;
**signi￿cant at 5%; ***signi￿cant at 1%
(G=YF) and the size of the informality (YI=YF). In columns (2) to (4), the correlation
of regulation and enforcement becomes very signi￿cant. Moreover, less enforcement
is linked to more informality, as would be expected. Moreover, a larger size of gov-
ernment is associated with more enforcement. The results remain the same, even
when replacing ￿ by the regulation measure used as the input in the computations
or when using the tax rate ￿ instead of the size of government.
5 Policy reforms
5.1 Reallocating taxes and enforcement
After considering the baseline case, a natural question is whether the government is
choosing tax and enforcement in the best possible way. I take the level of govern-
ment expenditures and the regulation cost, from the previous section, as given and
maximize household utility choosing the tax and enforcement rates. The problem
of the government is:
max
￿;e u(C;G), (2.27)
where G is the level of public good given by the baseline calibration.
Since uC > 0; the choice here is basically the pair (￿￿;e￿) which delivers the
largest possible C. The following table gives the results for the resulting policy
reform. The ￿rst four columns bring the ￿; e; and the size of the informal sector,30 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
which were computed in the baseline calibration. The next two columns present the
new policy in terms of taxes and enforcement. The following column presents the
percentage gain of consumption with the policy reform, while the last column brings
the resulting size of informality after the policy.
Comparing the enforcement to the baseline, 13 countries out of 29 increased the
enforcement rate. Nine of these are the countries with the lowest regulation costs in
the sample. The average gain in consumption is 1.2%. Canada and Austria had the
largest increases in C: Canada bene￿ts from a large decrease in taxes whereas Aus-
tria bene￿ts from a decrease in enforcement, generating an increase in the informal
sector. In the Canadian case, the country had low informality and low regulation.
Then, a small increase in enforcement is enough to reduce further informality and
allow for tax cuts in the formal sector. In the case of Austria, it had the largest
enforcement rate and quite low informality. The optimal policy was to increase in-
formality and avoid wasting resources with regulation. The economy with regulation
made it possible to substantially boost private consumption, keeping the government
revenue constant by increasing taxes in the formal sector by 1.7 percentage points.
The countries with lowest regulation are also those that manage to reduce their
informal sectors substantially more. In particular, the U.S., New Zealand, and
Canada managed to completely eliminate the informal sector with the policy re-
form. What happens here is that the elasticity of informality with respect to tax
and enforcement is pretty large and larger for countries with lower regulation. For
the other countries, most of them end up with sizes of the informal sector between
20% and 33%, except Mexico which gets an increase to 61%. The suggested reform
for Mexico is to decrease the tax base in the formal sector and increase taxes, re-
membering that Mexico had very low taxes to start with. This allows Mexico to
raise the same government revenue. Why is this policy which hikes informality up
desirable? The reason is that enforcement is reduced in the informal sector, which
is now 60% of the formal economy. This reduction in enforcement increases pro￿ts
in the informal sector, which directly bene￿ts the representative household￿ s con-
sumption, thereby reducing the distortionary e⁄ect of enforcement in the informal
sector. At the same time, the distortions associated with regulation in the formal
sector are also reduced. It is important to stress that regulation costs are a waste
in the economy and, in the case of Mexico, they are quite high.Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 31
Concerning the choice of enforcement levels, one could ask what makes the U.S.
want such a low e and Denmark, for example, a much higher one? The answer about
the di⁄erence between U.S. and Denmark lies in the size of government. Remember
that e must be larger than ￿, otherwise no formal sector exists and the supply of
public good is zero. Then, Denmark starts with a "lower bound" for enforcement
that is much higher than that of the U.S. Due to the high Danish level of government
expenditures as compared to the U.S., Denmark needs a tax rate almost twice the
American one. Why is this preferred? Denmark manages to keep a not so large
informal sector (18% in the baseline calibration; and 12% after the policy reform),
having a large government and a ￿ve times larger regulation. The U.S. starts o⁄ in
much better conditions: 40% smaller government size and very low regulation.
The facts that the suggested reforms in many countries are close to their previous
policies and most of the countries with high regulation still keep signi￿cant levels of
informality suggest that the regulation costs play an important role in determining
the level of the informal sector. If these countries reduce the regulation costs, this
would allow them to substantially reduce the informal sector. This is exactly what
is observed for the countries with lowest regulation in the sample.
5.2 Reforming regulation
5.2.1 Shadow value of regulation
As seen in the previous section, regulation plays a signi￿cant role in determining
the size of the informal sector. But it is not the scope for government policy in
this model. Nonetheless, the model can be useful in measuring the bene￿ts of
reducing regulation. Then, the natural question to ask is what is the shadow value
of regulation costs (￿) in the equilibrium I have computed. The next table presents
the percentage consumption increase for three di⁄erent changes in regulation: (1) a
reduction of 1% in ￿; (2) a reduction of 10% in ￿; and (3) a reduction of ￿ by 0.01.
It is clear that reducing regulation makes informality smaller. It becomes "cheaper"
to operate in the formal sector. However, production in the formal sector is also
taxed. Then, the results for the ￿rst two columns (the percentage decreases in ￿)
show that countries with higher taxation bene￿t more from the reduction in regula-
tion. Take the case of Mexico, with low taxation, which is the country that bene￿ts32 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
the least from the policy. Meanwhile, Sweden and Denmark are the countries which
bene￿t the most. Not by coincidence, they have the largest size of government. The
third column shows results for a decrease of 0.01 in the regulation cost. This time,
the countries which bene￿t more were exactly the countries with lower regulation.
This is not surprising, since those are the countries with the largest percentage
decrease in regulation.
5.2.2 A counterfactual experiment
The purpose of this counterfactual experiment is to explore the shadow value of
regulation. What reduction in the regulation cost ￿ is needed to achieve the level
of informality of Switzerland, 8.6%?16 The following table presents the answer to
this question.
Once more, the countries bene￿tting the most are those with a large regulation.
The average unweighted increase in consumption is 2.1%. It is important to mention
that this experiment is done keeping the level of government expenditures of the
baseline calibration and holding taxes and enforcement constant. Comparing these
gains to those obtained reforming taxes and enforcement gives another indication
that the reduction in regulation can be a more e⁄ective policy in both increasing
welfare and reducing the size of the informal sector.
6 Accounting for income di⁄erences
One interesting question that can be answered with the baseline model is to what
extent the distortions associated with informality can account for the income di⁄er-
ences among the richest and the poorest countries. Since ￿, total factor productivity
works as a level parameter in the model, I set it equal to 1 for all countries in the
baseline calibration so that TFP di⁄erences do not in￿ uence the results. Therefore,
the level of formal output computed for the baseline calibration, YF, only captures
the e⁄ects due to regulation, enforcement, and taxation associated with the size of
the informal economy in each country. When comparing YF to measures of actual
16 Switzerland was chosen because it has the informal sector with the lowest size in the
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Figure 2.4: GDP per capita: data vs. model
per capita GDP, the correlation is very strong, as can be observed in the following
plot. This is an indication that the distortions associated with informality play a
role in accounting for income di⁄erences across countries.
Let the total-factor productivity parameter ￿ be calibrated so that per capita
GDP in the model, YF, equals the value in the data. The ￿rst result is that the
calibrated ￿ is also strongly correlated with measures of TFP in the data. This is
very reassuring. The correlation between ￿ and a measure of TFP computed by
Hall and Jones (1999) is 0.7 and signi￿cant at the 1% level.
Table 2.9 brings ￿gures for: (1) actual GDP per capita (PPP, measured in current
US$) in 1999; (2) the same ￿gure relative to the U.S level; (3) the computed output
per capita (YF) with ￿ = 1; (4) the ratio between YF and Y USA
F , the U.S. formal
output per capita; (5) the TFP ￿; and (6) the Hall and Jones￿ s (1999) TFP A
relative to the U.S. Not surprisingly, the U.S. formal GDP is much higher than
that of Burkina Faso. Hall and Jones (1999) report that the richest countries in
the world have an output per worker that is roughly 35 times that of the poorest34 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
countries. And this is about the di⁄erence between the GDP per capita of the U.S.
and Burkina Faso in the data shown below. Following Hall and Jones (1999), we can
break down the di⁄erences in actual output into di⁄erences associated with savings,
human capital, and total factor productivity. The last item is a remainder and can
be considered to capture di⁄erences in "social infrastructure", a term used by Hall
and Jones (1999). They argue that savings rates account for a factor of 1.5 and
human capital accounts for a factor of 3. We observe that Y USA
F is higher by a
factor of 1.5 in our model. It is not huge, but it is nontrivial. Building on Hall
and Jones (1999), I conclude that regulation, enforcement, and taxation of formal
activities leading to a large informal sector account for roughly a factor of 1.5 of the
output di⁄erences. TFP di⁄erences account for the remaining factor of 5, so that
1:5 ￿ 3 ￿ 1:5 ￿ 5 ￿ 35.
7 Concluding Remarks
I construct a simple general-equilibrium micro-founded model to quantitatively ac-
count for the degree of informality across countries. In the model, ￿rms choose to
which sector to belong based on proportional taxation in the formal sector, "reg-
ulation" of formal ￿rms (￿xed, red-tape cost ￿), and enforcement of/punishment
against informality. Su¢ ciently large ￿rms ￿nd formality to be bene￿cial. Using
the model, I back out [see before, I do not understand the use of "back out"
here] what enforcement level is needed, country by country, to match the data for
29 countries. The model quantitatively accounts for the degree of informality and
other key aspects, such as size of government, regulation costs, and income di⁄er-
ences. The computed enforcement is positively correlated with indirect measures of
tax compliance. Moreover, enforcement is positively correlated with regulation and
government expenditures and, as expected, negatively correlated with the size of
the informal sector. I ￿nd that there is some scope for policy reform (using e and ￿
as instruments). In general, most countries would do better to decrease informality,
although some would bene￿t from increasing it. In both cases, the welfare gains can
be fairly large. The countries bene￿ting the most are those with lower regulation
costs.Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 35
The previous result suggests that regulation plays a signi￿cant role in the equi-
librium determination and its reduction can potentially be a more e⁄ective policy for
increasing private consumption and reducing informality. In particular, since regu-
lation is a distortion in the formal sector, it should be zero. Then, I look at what
countries would gain from decreasing regulation (￿), in a hypothetical exercise. I do
not have a model for determining the regulation cost, but I can compute the shadow
value of decreasing regulation. Thus, we do not know how much it would cost to
allow this decrease, but my model allows us to compute the bene￿ts. The result is
that bene￿ts are very large, almost twice the welfare gains of reforming taxes and
enforcement. Finally, I perform some counterfactual experiments by reducing the
regulation cost. I conclude that a policy reducing this waste factor in the economy
has a positive impact on the supply of both private and publicly provided goods,
e⁄ectively reducing the informal sector.
A by-product of the model is that I can account for how the distortions associated
with informality reduce output per capita across countries. The output per capita
and total-factor productivity delivered by the model are highly correlated with its
counterpart in the data. I ￿nd that the aforementioned distortions account for a
factor of 1.5 of the output per capita di⁄erence between the richest and the poorest
countries.36 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal SectorsBibliography
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Appendix
A1 Basics of the model
Individual good demand De￿ne the aggregate output Y is the numeraire in the
economy. Then, we can maximize it subject to the constraint that the sum of the













p(z)y(z)dF(z) = Y (2.29)









where ￿ is the multiplier in the constraint. We can now multiply y(z) on both sides























￿ = 1: (2.31)















y(z) = Y p(z)
￿￿: (2.32)
The rest of the algebra follows directly and equation (A.6) gives the individual
demand for good z.Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 41
Firms￿pro￿t maximization problem The price charged by a ￿rm with produc-
tivity z in the sector J = F;I is derived below from the ￿rms￿pro￿t maximization
problem (2.2), subject to individual demand (2.7).
max
pJ(z)
￿(z) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿IF ￿ eII)pJ(z)y(z) ￿ wl(z) ￿ IFw￿;
subject to
y(z) = Y pJ(z)
￿￿:
We can start by replacing l(z) by the production function (2.1). Then, we can
replace y(z) by individual demand into the objective function:
￿(z) = max
pJ(z)





Now, we can take a ￿rst-order condition with respect to pJ(z) :




























































































































Labor-market clearing condition We start with the condition (2.18) and apply
the parametrization in subsection 3.4:
LF + LI + ￿N

























































































































Equilibrium condition for the threshold z￿ We can then equate equations
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Rearranging some terms and applying the parametrization in subsection 3.4
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A3 Tables
Table 2.2: Regulation of entry, size of the informal sector, and per capita GDP in
selected economies
Regulation Size of the Per capita
of Entry Informal Sector GDP
Country name (time + cost) (as % of formal GDP) (current US$)
Argentina 0.2917 25.4 7767
Armenia 0.3243 46.3 595
Australia 0.0292 14.3 21253
Austria 0.4140 9.8 26632
Belgium 0.2316 22.2 24555
Bolivia 2.9903 67.1 1017
Brazil 0.5362 39.8 3132
Bulgaria 0.2341 36.9 1577
Burkina Faso 3.1165 41.4 256
Canada 0.0211 16.0 21352
Chile 0.2413 19.8 4795
China 0.4959 13.1 864
Colombia 0.3518 39.1 2084
Croatia 0.6234 33.4 4375
Czech Republic 0.3324 19.1 5743
Denmark 0.1104 18.0 32548
Dominican Republic 0.7345 32.1 2134
Ecuador 0.8807 34.4 1375
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.1881 35.1 1374
Finland 0.1071 18.1 24748
France 0.3472 15.2 24834
Georgia 0.9154 67.3 586
Germany 0.3203 16.0 26114
Ghana 0.3938 41.9 397
Greece 0.7692 28.7 11032
Hong Kong, China 0.0917 16.6 24716
Hungary 1.0068 25.1 4693
India 0.8824 23.1 452
Indonesia 0.9656 19.4 688
Ireland 0.1515 15.9 25332
Israel 0.3270 21.9 16988
Italy 0.4407 27.1 20478
Jamaica 0.2400 36.4 3041
Japan 0.2104 11.2 35160
Jordan 0.7164 19.4 1749
Kazakhstan 0.6847 43.2 1130
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continued from previous page
Regulation Size of the Per capita
of Entry Informal Sector GDP
Country name (time + cost) (as % of formal GDP) (current US$)
Kenya 0.6408 34.3 430
Korea, Rep. 0.2526 27.5 9554
Kyrgyz Republic 0.4238 39.8 257
Latvia 0.4381 39.9 3021
Lebanon 1.3987 34.1 5057
Lithuania 0.2306 30.3 3070
Madagascar 1.0589 39.6 236
Malawi 0.4342 40.3 158
Malaysia 0.4235 31.1 3520
Mali 42.3 227
Mexico 0.7682 30.1 4982
Mongolia 0.1184 18.4 381
Morocco 0.4272 36.4 1281
Mozambique 1.7236 40.3 227
Netherlands 0.3016 13.1 25216
New Zealand 0.0169 12.8 14982
Nigeria 2.7752 57.9 303
Norway 0.1158 19.1 35448
Pakistan 0.5517 36.8 467
Panama 0.2983 64.1 3959
Peru 0.5680 59.9 2011
Philippines 0.3728 43.4 1025
Poland 0.4641 27.6 4344
Portugal 0.4768 22.7 11313
Romania 0.5348 34.4 1585
Russian Federation 0.5635 46.1 1339
Senegal 1.6100 45.1 471
Singapore 0.2593 13.1 20592
Slovak Republic 0.4940 18.9 3778
Slovenia 0.3804 27.1 10811
South Africa 0.1900 28.4 3103
Spain 0.4846 22.7 15469
Sri Lanka 0.2887 44.6 822
Sweden 0.0746 19.2 28374
Switzerland 0.2422 8.6 37097
Taiwan,China 25.4
Tanzania 3.2862 58.3 254
Thailand 0.2023 52.6 2010
Tunisia 0.3284 38.4 2200
Turkey 0.3781 32.1 2773
Uganda 0.4980 43.1 255
Ukraine 0.4231 52.2 636
United Kingdom 0.0290 12.7 24879
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continued from previous page
Regulation Size of the Per capita
of Entry Informal Sector GDP
Country name (time + cost) (as % of formal GDP) (current US$)
United States 0.0205 8.7 33028
Uruguay 0.5491 51.1 6389
Venezuela, RB 0.5108 33.6 4105
Vietnam 1.7856 15.6 370
Zambia 0.7643 48.9 299
Zimbabwe 0.3282 59.4 478
Source: Own computations using Djankov et al￿ s (2002) and World Bank￿ s (2006) data.
The size of the informal sector data is from Schneider (2006)48 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
Table 2.4: Baseline computation
Data Model
Countryname G=YF Informal/YF Regulation cost ￿ ￿ e
United States 28.9 8.7 0.0205 0.289 0.0355 0.3369
Australia 30.8 14.3 0.0292 0.308 0.0495 0.3553
Korea 23.6 27.5 0.2526 0.236 0.3509 0.3677
New Zealand 33.9 12.8 0.0169 0.339 0.0305 0.3688
Mexico 17.3 30.1 0.7682 0.173 0.9748 0.3803
Canada 35.9 16.0 0.0211 0.359 0.0382 0.3891
United Kingdom 36.1 12.7 0.0290 0.361 0.0538 0.4081
Brazil 31.7 39.8 0.5362 0.317 0.7681 0.4344
Turkey 31.3 32.1 0.3781 0.313 0.5648 0.4376
Ireland 31.0 15.9 0.1515 0.310 0.2497 0.4513
Japan 26.4 11.2 0.2104 0.264 0.3322 0.4803
Norway 40.4 19.1 0.1158 0.404 0.2161 0.4953
Poland 35.0 27.6 0.4641 0.350 0.7503 0.4958
Portugal 34.0 22.7 0.4768 0.340 0.7806 0.5122
Spain 35.0 22.7 0.4846 0.350 0.8046 0.5206
Greece 37.0 28.7 0.7692 0.370 1.2702 0.5335
Slovak Rep 34.4 18.9 0.4940 0.344 0.8285 0.5384
Switzerland 29.8 8.6 0.2422 0.298 0.4011 0.5442
Czech Rep 38.9 19.1 0.3324 0.389 0.5974 0.5460
Finland 47.0 18.1 0.1071 0.470 0.2250 0.5508
Germany 37.7 16.0 0.3203 0.377 0.5738 0.5532
Italy 43.3 27.1 0.4407 0.433 0.8122 0.5595
Belgium 45.3 22.2 0.2316 0.453 0.4562 0.5612
Hungary 39.1 25.1 1.0068 0.391 1.7445 0.5773
Sweden 52.3 19.2 0.0746 0.523 0.1733 0.5773
Denmark 51.5 18.0 0.1104 0.515 0.2522 0.5907
Netherlands 41.2 13.1 0.3016 0.412 0.5764 0.5940
France 45.7 15.2 0.3472 0.457 0.7059 0.6197
Austria 44.0 9.8 0.4140 0.440 0.8253 0.6578
Source: Data: Djankov et al (2002), OECD(2003), Schneider (2006); Model: own computationsChapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 49
Table 2.6: Policy reforms on taxes and enforcement
Benchmark Optimal policy
Countryname ￿ e YI=YF ￿￿ e￿ ￿C(%) YI=YF
United States 0.289 0.3369 8.7 0.2699 0.3552 1.69 0.0
Australia 0.308 0.3553 14.3 0.2784 0.3924 2.23 0.5
Korea 0.236 0.3677 27.5 0.2408 0.3591 0.06 30.9
New Zealand 0.339 0.3688 12.8 0.3055 0.3710 3.90 0.0
Mexico 0.173 0.3803 30.1 0.2041 0.3103 2.00 61.4
Canada 0.359 0.3891 16.0 0.3169 0.3975 4.77 0.0
United Kingdom 0.361 0.4081 12.7 0.3310 0.4388 2.54 0.4
Brazil 0.317 0.4344 39.8 0.3068 0.4445 0.14 33.9
Turkey 0.313 0.4376 32.1 0.3086 0.4432 0.04 29.5
Ireland 0.310 0.4513 15.9 0.3145 0.4408 0.07 18.5
Japan 0.264 0.4803 11.2 0.2828 0.4094 1.52 24.8
Norway 0.404 0.4953 19.1 0.3915 0.5112 0.46 13.4
Poland 0.350 0.4958 27.6 0.3521 0.4929 0.01 28.8
Portugal 0.340 0.5122 22.7 0.3509 0.4923 0.31 29.3
Spain 0.350 0.5206 22.7 0.3603 0.5022 0.28 28.9
Greece 0.370 0.5335 28.7 0.3764 0.5247 0.09 32.4
Slovak Rep 0.344 0.5384 18.9 0.3603 0.5025 0.85 29.2
Switzerland 0.298 0.5442 8.6 0.3187 0.4504 2.65 24.1
Czech Rep 0.389 0.5460 19.1 0.3965 0.5322 0.17 23.3
Finland 0.470 0.5508 18.1 0.4556 0.5653 0.74 12.1
Germany 0.377 0.5532 16.0 0.3892 0.5249 0.61 23.3
Italy 0.433 0.5595 27.1 0.4279 0.5652 0.06 24.5
Belgium 0.453 0.5612 22.2 0.4454 0.5700 0.18 18.6
Hungary 0.391 0.5773 25.1 0.4043 0.5564 2.66 33.2
Sweden 0.523 0.5773 19.2 0.4948 0.5911 0.48 9.0
Denmark 0.515 0.5907 18.0 0.5007 0.6028 0.84 12.2
Netherlands 0.412 0.5940 13.1 0.4256 0.5574 1.10 21.5
France 0.457 0.6197 15.2 0.4678 0.5963 0.70 21.6
Austria 0.440 0.6578 9.8 0.4571 0.5903 3.54 23.350 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
Table 2.7: Consumption % increase for di⁄erent changes in ￿
Countryname ￿1% ￿10% ￿0:01
United States 0.05 0.50 1.42
New Zealand 0.04 0.45 1.48
Canada 0.06 0.58 1.52
United Kingdom 0.08 0.84 1.57
Australia 0.07 0.72 1.45
Sweden 0.14 1.43 0.81
Finland 0.12 1.25 0.54
Denmark 0.14 1.45 0.56
Norway 0.10 1.03 0.46
Ireland 0.08 0.81 0.31
Japan 0.07 0.73 0.21
Belgium 0.11 1.20 0.25
Switzerland 0.08 0.82 0.19
Korea 0.06 0.62 0.17
Netherlands 0.10 1.13 0.18
Germany 0.09 1.01 0.16
Czech Rep 0.10 1.05 0.17
France 0.13 1.28 0.17
Turkey 0.04 0.79 0.12
Austria 0.12 1.23 0.14
Italy 0.11 1.13 0.14
Brazil 0.07 0.81 0.11
Poland 0.08 0.89 0.11
Portugal 0.09 0.90 0.11
Spain 0.09 0.93 0.11
Slovak Rep 0.07 0.92 0.11
Greece 0.09 0.96 0.07
Mexico 0.04 0.52 0.04
Hungary 0.12 1.07 0.06Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors 51
Table 2.8: Reduction in ￿ to achieve Swiss informality
Countryname ￿0 ￿￿ ￿C(%)
Switzerland 0.4011 0.0 0.0
United States 0.0353 -0.6 0.0
New Zealand 0.0248 -18.7 0.1
United Kingdom 0.0432 -19.7 0.2
Canada 0.0267 -30.1 0.2
Australia 0.0367 -25.9 0.3
Sweden 0.0926 -46.6 0.7
Austria 0.6813 -17.4 0.8
Japan 0.2477 -25.4 1.0
Denmark 0.1330 -47.3 1.1
Finland 0.1188 -47.2 1.1
Norway 0.1071 -50.4 1.2
Ireland 0.1387 -44.5 1.4
Netherlands 0.3410 -40.8 1.8
Belgium 0.1638 -64.1 2.2
France 0.3404 -51.8 2.3
Germany 0.2663 -53.6 2.4
Korea 0.0986 -71.9 2.5
Czech Rep 0.2254 -62.3 2.7
Turkey 0.1169 -79.3 3.2
Italy 0.1899 -76.6 3.4
Slovak Rep 0.2800 -66.2 3.5
Brazil 0.1096 -85.7 3.6
Poland 0.1688 -77.5 3.6
Portugal 0.2159 -72.3 3.7
Spain 0.2212 -72.5 3.7
Greece 0.2231 -82.4 4.8
Mexico 0.1626 -83.3 5.0
Hungary 0.3216 -81.6 5.452 Chapter 2. Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors
Table 2.9: Income and TFP across countries
Country GDP per capitaa GDPpc/GDPpcUSA YF YF=Y USA
F ￿ TFPb
United States 32732 1.00 1.674 1.00 19556 1.000
New Zealand 18843 0.58 1.623 0.97 11608 0.631
Canada 25811 0.79 1.577 0.94 16364 1.034
United Kingdom 25399 0.78 1.608 0.96 15796 1.011
Australia 24699 0.75 1.591 0.95 15520 0.856
Sweden 24377 0.74 1.483 0.89 16438 0.897
Finland 23900 0.73 1.478 0.88 16170 0.728
Denmark 27120 0.83 1.469 0.88 18457 0.705
Norway 32854 1.00 1.474 0.88 22289 0.699
Ireland 27556 0.84 1.494 0.89 18448 0.709
Japan 25105 0.77 1.506 0.90 16673 0.658
Belgium 25743 0.79 1.401 0.84 18374 0.978
Switzerland 28991 0.89 1.498 0.89 19359 0.883
Korea. Rep. 14849 0.45 1.382 0.83 10745 0.580
Netherlands 27332 0.84 1.437 0.86 19021 0.946
Germany 24231 0.74 1.427 0.85 16985 0.912
Czech Republic 14442 0.44 1.405 0.84 10277 0.241
France 24241 0.74 1.405 0.84 17248 1.126
Turkey 6018 0.18 1.323 0.79 4547 0.503
Austria 27534 0.84 1.405 0.84 19594 0.979
Italy 23721 0.72 1.333 0.80 17797 1.207
Brazil 6985 0.21 1.256 0.75 5561 0.758
Poland 9726 0.30 1.338 0.80 7267 0.235
Portugal 17221 0.53 1.367 0.82 12595 0.755
Spain 20187 0.62 1.365 0.82 14791 1.107
Slovak Republic 10800 0.33 1.384 0.83 7801 0.241
Greece 16269 0.50 1.299 0.78 12524 0.674
Mexico 8433 0.26 1.313 0.78 6424 0.926
Hungary 12017 0.37 1.296 0.77 9276 0.293
Peru 4561 0.14 1.133 0.68 4025 0.409
Burkina Faso 990 0.03 1.182 0.71 837 0.101
Source: aWorld Bank (2006), bHall and Jones (1999)Chapter 3





There has been a spectacular increase in capital ￿ ows in the last two decades. In
particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been growing three times as fast as
total investment between 1980 and 2000. Over this period, there has been also a
change in the nature of FDI ￿ owing to developing countries. Previously, foreign
investment was concentrated to the extraction of natural resources for shipment
abroad. Nowadays, as developing countries become wealthier, investment diversi￿es
into production of consumer goods for their local markets. The increasing size and
variety of these ￿ ows has made both economists and policy makers interested in
understanding their determinants and e⁄ects. Research, on the one hand, tries to
understand how FDI a⁄ects productivity and growth, or income inequality and the
environment. On the other hand, many studies try to pinpoint the host and source
country and industry characteristics behind FDI ￿ ows. A question of interest among
developing countries is what policies are better at attracting much needed capital
￿ This is a joint work with Mart￿n Gonzales-Eiras. We are grateful for comments by Torsten
Persson (in the early stages of this project), Ethan Kaplan, and participants in presentations at
IIES and the 2006 Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society. We thank Raquel Artecona
for providing the data on labor institutions to us. We are also thankful to Christina L￿nnblad
for editorial assistance. Financial support from Jan Wallander￿ s and Tom Hedelius￿ Research
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and new technologies. A number of studies have found that institutional quality
is a positive determinant of FDI (and thus, in particular, corruption is a negative
determinant), higher taxation reduces capital ￿ ows, and more protection of intellec-
tual property rights attracts high-tech investment. The data shows mixed results on
other dimensions of policy. For example, Rodrik (1996) found that countries with
higher labor standards attract more FDI, an e⁄ect that seems to disappear when
controlling for political risk (see Cho (2003)). And measures of labor costs and
workers￿bargaining power are found to have a negative e⁄ect on FDI (Smarzynska
and Spatareanu (2005) and Cooke (1997)).
In this essay, we analyze the determinants of FDI by looking at the determi-
nants of FDI composition. This is done by studying the interaction between some
industry characteristics and host country characteristics. We use capital intensity
and R&D expenditures for industry characteristics1 and measures on protection of
property rights, labor standards and constitutional arrangements for host country
characteristics. Our regressions show that a better protection of property rights
attracts high-tech investment; a result which is not surprising, given the correla-
tion that exists between the overall protection of property rights and the degree of
protection of intellectual property rights. But FDI ￿ owing to countries with a low
protection of property rights is not biased to less capital intensive sectors. We also
￿nd that countries which give workers more bargaining power attract less capital
intensive and high-tech investment. Finally, we ￿nd that a country￿ s constitutional
arrangement has an e⁄ect on FDI ￿ ows. We look at whether presidential regimes
and majoritarian electoral systems, as opposed to parliamentary and proportional,
respectively, have a di⁄erential e⁄ect on FDI. We ￿nd evidence of there being a neg-
ative e⁄ect of presidential regimes on R&D intensive FDI. This ￿nding is consistent
with recent results of Persson (2005) which show that these political institutions
have an e⁄ect on growth rates.
For our empirical analysis, we use data on US investment abroad provided by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. They provide yearly FDI data between 1999 and
2003 for 14 industry categories. Both manufacturing and services data is reported,
and capital and R&D intensity are calculated from this same data source. For host
1 Helpman et al (2004) use capital intensity and R&D intensity as proxies for unobserved industry
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country institutions, we use an average of data for the nineties, since some measures
do not have data available for more recent years. Ideally we would like to perform
a panel regression. But, due to the lack of data and time variation, we instead do
a cross-section analysis. As a ￿rst approximation, we look at the interactions of
industry characteristics with the institutional variables that constitute the focus of
our study. Given that other country characteristics might have di⁄erential e⁄ects
on FDI composition, we then introduce interaction terms of industry characteristics
with known determinants of FDI ￿ ows.2
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we summarize the state of
the current literature on determinants of FDI, with a particular emphasis on the
institutional characteristics that are subject to study in this essay. In section 3,
we develop the hypotheses we want to test. Section 4 presents the econometric
speci￿cation and describes the data used. Section 5 presents the results and in
section 6, we conclude and describe prospective further research.
2 Related literature
Researchers have had an interest in understanding FDI from two di⁄erent perspec-
tives. Trade economists are interested in FDI as a substitute for trade exports. A
￿rm has two ways of servicing a foreign market. It can either export ￿nal goods
produced at home, or it can directly set up multiple production plants in those mar-
kets. The importance of this decision can be grasped by noting that the largest 500
multinationals control approximately 50% of world trade (Rugman 1988). There are
many reasons why a ￿rm might choose the second alternative over the ￿rst. The size
of a host country market, its expected growth, input costs and natural resources,
as well as its policy environment, are of importance for this decision. There is also
a trade-o⁄ between proximity to costumers and the advantages of scale economies
from concentrated production. Riker and Brainard (1997) use US ￿rm level data
to test this last hypothesis. They ￿nd evidence that tari⁄s and trade costs have a
negative e⁄ect on the share of exports over total sales (exports plus a¢ liate sales),
while plant economies of scale have a positive e⁄ect on the export share. More re-
2 We control for population size, GDP per capita, trade openness, human capital, and the size
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cently, Helpman et al (2004) introduce intraindustry heterogeneity into a standard
proximity-concentration model. To control for omitted industry characteristics, they
include measures of capital intensity and R&D intensity. They ￿nd that capital in-
tensity has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on the ratio of exports to FDI sales, while
there is no signi￿cant e⁄ect of R&D intensity.
Development economists are interested in the e⁄ects of FDI on host countries￿
productivity and growth performance, and its environmental and social implications.
Aitken and Harrison (1999) studied if FDI ￿ ows had an e⁄ect on Venezuelan ￿rms
and found a small e⁄ect. Haskel et al (2002) studied the e⁄ect of FDI on a sample of
UK manufacturing ￿rms and found evidence of positive FDI spillovers, although the
size of these e⁄ects was not very large. Given that even if there are few spillovers, FDI
still brings new technologies and management skills to the host country, governments
all over the world compete for investment from multinational corporations. In order
to attract these capital ￿ ows, it is important to understand the factors in￿ uencing
FDI decisions as well as the determinants of the composition of such ￿ ows.
Smith (2001) studied how foreign patent rights a⁄ected US exports, a¢ liate sales
and licenses. She found that strong patent rights increase the ￿ ow of knowledge
to a¢ liates, as the risk of imitation is reduced. Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) ￿nds
similar results using ￿rm data for Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries.
It is also found that weak protection deters FDI in technology-intensive sectors, and
biases investment on projects focusing on distribution rather than local production.
A number of papers have shown that host countries￿institutional quality in general
is a signi￿cant determinant of FDI ￿ ows.3 Alfaro et al (2003) ￿nd evidence that
institutional quality is the most important predictor of capital ￿ ows for the period
1971-1998. As measures of institutional quality, they use government stability,
internal con￿ ict, corruption, observance of the law, repudiation of contracts, and
expropriation risk. Of these measures, the one that received most attention in the
literature is corruption. Wei (2000) ￿nds that corruption has a large negative e⁄ect
on FDI using data on ￿ ows between 12 source countries and 45 host countries. The
e⁄ect found is the economic equivalent of an increase of up to 50 percentage points
in the tax rate. Finally, using the same ￿rm level data of Smarzynska Javorcik
3 In fact, there is a strong correlation between these measures of institutional quality and the
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(2004), Smarzynska and Wei (2000) ￿nd that corruption does not only discourage
inward FDI, but also shifts the ownership structure towards joint ventures. They
conclude that this is evidence of the value of a local partner in minimizing the costs
of bureaucratic procedures. They ￿nd no e⁄ect of corruption on R&D intensive
FDI, but technologically more advanced ￿rms retain ownership in more corrupt
countries.4
Another series of papers has studied the impact of labor market regulations and
labor standards on FDI. Cooke (1997) found that US FDI was negatively a⁄ected
by the presence of high levels of union penetration, centralized collective bargaining
structures, and sti⁄ restrictions on layo⁄s. Conversely, Rodrik (1996) found that
countries with higher labor standards (as measured by the total number of Interna-
tional Labor Organization conventions rati￿ed by the country) attract more FDI.
Recently, Cho (2003) showed that replicating Rodrik￿ s regression with political sta-
bility as an added regressor eliminated the signi￿cance of labor standards on FDI
￿ ows. In her regressions, it is a higher level of political risk that discourages FDI
￿ ows. Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) use ￿rm level data for 25 Euro-
pean countries and ￿nd that greater ￿ exibility in the host country￿ s labor market
(measured by ￿ exibility of dismissals, length of notice period, and required sever-
ance payments) is associated with larger FDI ￿ ows. FDI in service sectors appears
to be more a⁄ected than investment in manufactures, something they attribute to
services being more labor intensive than manufactures.
There is another literature that studies the e⁄ects of constitutions on economic
policymaking. Persson and Tabellini (2003 and 2004) have found systematic and
quantitatively large e⁄ects of both electoral rules and forms of governments on ￿scal
policy and corruption. They ￿nd that the size of the government, as a percent-
age of GDP, is 5 percentage points lower in countries with presidential regimes and
majoritarian electoral systems. There is also an e⁄ect of these constitutional vari-
ables on the composition of expenditure, with welfare spending being 2 percentage
points lower in countries with presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral sys-
tems. Although this research started with the aim of empirically validating theoret-
4 See also Henisz (2000), who examines the e⁄ect of corruption on FDI, market entry, and
ownership mode for US based multinational ￿rms, ￿nding at most a positive e⁄ect of corruption
on FDI ￿ ows. Hines (1995) also failed in ￿nding a negative correlation between aggregate FDI
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ical models of how the rules of policymaking a⁄ected actual policy5 , it is spreading
in new directions. Persson (2005) combines these insights with research on long-run
economic development that shows certain structural policies to be essential for eco-
nomic performance. He shows constitutional arrangements to have an e⁄ect on some
structural policies (protection of property rights, and trade openness) that promote
long-run economic growth. In particular, he ￿nds that parliamentary democracies
with proportional representation produce the most growth promoting policies.
3 Hypotheses to be tested
We are primarily interested in the determinants of the composition of FDI ￿ ows.
Therefore, we need to di⁄erentiate these ￿ ows according to some dimensions that
might be of interest both to the economic researcher and the policymaker. We will
concentrate on two characteristics of ￿ ows that seem to be particularly relevant; cap-
ital intensity and R&D intensity. Several studies use one or both of these variables6 ,
thus giving us con￿dence in the academic front. And FDI is seen as globalization at
its best for developing countries, not only providing capital but a potent bundle of
capital, managerial and technological knowledge. Thus, policymakers in developing
countries would agree with us on the importance of understanding what policies
attract more R&D and capital intensive FDI.
As we just saw in the previous section, better institutions in general attract more
aggregate ￿ ows, and better protection of intellectual property rights in particular
biases these ￿ ows towards more technology-intensive sectors. It seems natural to
ask whether other dimensions of a host country￿ s institutional strength also have
a di⁄erential e⁄ect on the composition of FDI ￿ ows. Given that corruption has
received substantial attention in previous works, we would like to see if countries with
less corruption indeed receive more R&D intensive investments than more corrupt
countries. Another measure of institutional quality that we study is expropriation
risk. We would expect that the higher is this risk, the less capital and R&D intensive
will foreign investments be. Observance of the law, repudiation of contracts, and
5 See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001).
6 As reported above, Helpman et al (2004) use both capital and R&D intensity as proxies
for industry unobservables. Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) and Smarzynska and Wei (2000) try to
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the quality of the bureaucracy are also expected to have a similar e⁄ect on the
composition of FDI ￿ ows.
Why would the composition of FDI ￿ ows be a⁄ected by labor institutions? We
have seen that the literature has found a number of e⁄ects of labor market charac-
teristics on the size of aggregate ￿ ows. It does not surprise us to see that countries
with less ￿ exible labor markets receive less investments. It has long been known
that one of the driving forces behind the decision to move production abroad is to
reduce input costs. If regulations make hiring labor more expensive, investment will
in general be lower. Instead of looking at measures of labor market ￿ exibility (sev-
erance payments or ￿ exibility of dismissals), we study the e⁄ect of an increase in
the power of labor negotiation on the composition of ￿ ows. As workers￿bargaining
power increases, the higher are their wages, especially in capital and R&D intensive
industries, where there are more economic rents to bargain for. Thus, we expect
to see less capital and R&D intensive foreign investment in countries with higher
union penetration. We also check whether collective bargaining has an e⁄ect on
the composition of FDI ￿ ows. We expect to see two opposite forces at work. On
the one hand, centralized bargaining results in more union power and thus, should
a⁄ect FDI composition in a similar way as union penetration. On the other hand,
decentralized bargaining means that labor contracts within an industry more closely
follow ￿rms￿productivity levels, thus potentially deterring capital and R&D inten-
sive investment. Anticipating our results, we ￿nd that the former e⁄ect dominates,
but the impact on FDI composition is weaker than that found for unionization.
We are ￿nally interested in studying whether host countries￿political arrange-
ments have an e⁄ect on the level and composition of FDI. Although it seems un-
realistic to think that a country would reform its constitution to change its form
of government just to attract more FDI, we expect this research to be useful in
two respects. First, by contributing to further understanding why some countries
are better at attracting foreign investment than others. If constitutional features
are part of the reason why a country fails to deliver policies that create the invest-
ment friendly environment desired by multinational corporations, there is no point
in pushing the country for structural reforms. At the same time, as research ￿nds
more evidence on the social and economic costs of some forms of government, there
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Persson (2005), we expect to see higher FDI ￿ ows in parliamentary democracies
with proportional representation and a bias in these ￿ ows towards more capital and
R&D intensive sectors.
4 Econometric speci￿cation and data
4.1 Econometric speci￿cation
Given that we want to estimate the e⁄ect of institutional variables on the compo-
sition of FDI, we should ideally use panel data with variation in source and host
countries, and with data for a long period and a large number of industries. This
would provide some time variation in the institutional variables of interest while, at
the same time, making it possible to use country ￿xed e⁄ects to control for other
country unobservables. Moreover, if there is time variation in the industry character-
istics, such as R&D intensity, we could also control for other industry unobservables
by using industry ￿xed e⁄ects. Having several source countries would also allow us
to test whether it is host country institutions per se that are of importance, or both
source and host country institutions (conveniently compared) that a⁄ect bilateral
￿ ows. The data to which we have access limits our ability to perform this analysis.
We have institutional data up to the end of the nineties, and FDI out￿ ows from a
single source country, the U.S., into 56 host countries from 1999 to 2003.
Thus, we restrict ourselves to performing a cross-section study trying to get
the most out of our data. For that reason, we exploit the variation in industry
characteristics to see the di⁄erential e⁄ects of institutional variables on sectoral
FDI, while at the same time controlling for country characteristics. Thus, to give an
example, we do not directly estimate the e⁄ect of corruption on FDI, but whether
more corrupt countries attract more or less capital intensive FDI.
To perform these regressions, we should take into account the existence of many
zero, and even negative, values for some sector-country pairs, meaning FDI in￿ ows.
Moreover, when seeing a negative value for FDI, we are not certain of whether that
value re￿ ects the desired actual level of negative investment, or just the observed
level of disinvestment given the constraints in reducing exposure in a given host
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speci￿cation.7 The regression to estimate is
ln(FDIic) = Xi￿ + IcXi￿ + ￿c + ￿ (3.1)
where FDIic is investment in sector i in country c, Ic is a vector of institutional
variables in country c, Xi is a vector of industry i characteristics, and ￿ is the
regression coe¢ cient we want to estimate: the interaction between institutions and
industry characteristics on FDI ￿ ows. Finally, the ￿c are country ￿xed e⁄ects and
the error term ￿ is assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed with mean zero and
variance ￿2. In this speci￿cation, there will be positive foreign investment when
Xi￿ +IcXi￿ +￿c +￿ > 0, and when Xi￿ +IcXi￿ +￿c +￿ ￿ 0 the realized level will
be zero (and the desired level might be negative, as seen in the data).
The use of country ￿xed e⁄ects allows us to correctly estimate this di⁄erential
e⁄ect under the hypothesis that the institutional variable of interest in the regres-
sion, corruption for example, is the only country characteristic with a di⁄erential
e⁄ect on FDI composition. Given that this is a strong assumption, we perform an-
other set of regressions. In these, we introduce interaction terms between country
characteristics that have been found to a⁄ect FDI, or that we expect could possibly
a⁄ect the composition of FDI, and industry characteristics. The variables we use
are population, as market size is a signi￿cant determinant of capital ￿ ows, GDP per
capita, as a proxy of labor costs, trade openness (measured as exports plus imports
over GDP), which gives a measure of the ability to integrate production chains in
a given country, government expenditure (as a fraction of GDP), to proxy for tax
rates, and human capital. We denote the vector of these variables by Wc. The
following is the equation we estimate
ln(FDIic) = Xi￿ + IcXi￿ + WcXi￿ + ￿c + ￿: (3.2)
Finally, as a robustness check, we drop the country ￿xed e⁄ects and instead use
the above mentioned country variables, and their interaction with industry charac-
teristics, along with other regressors8 . The estimated equation is
7 Given that we use logarithm of FDI as our independent variable, we replace zeroes and negative
values by small positive numbers, such that the log gives a large negative number, and we truncate
the distribution just below the lowest positive observation. Performing small changes in this
threshold has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the regressions.
8 We use continental dummies to proxy for geographical location variables that might a⁄ect FDI62 Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI
ln(FDIic) = Xi￿ + IcXi￿ + WcXi￿ + Wc + ￿: (3.3)
As another check, we also did a regression with the same regressors as the above,
replacing industry characteristics by industry ￿xed e⁄ects. The results are very
similar in signi￿cance and size and thus, we do not report them.
4.2 Data description
The data used in this study mainly comes from three sources. The data to compute
our dependent variable, the U.S. direct investment abroad (USFDI), comes from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. We use
Total Capital Flows, detailed by industry and by country. The variable is measured
in millions of dollars and the data available is for 56 countries plus some regional
aggregates. We average the annual Total Capital Flows across years for the period
1999-2003 for each country and each industry category.
In addition, we computed two variables for each industry category: capital in-
tensity, the ratio between capital and labor expenditures (CAPINT); and the ratio
between R&D and capital expenditures (RDCAP). A list of categories and their
respective characteristics is included on Table 3.1.9
The data on labor market indicators comes from a cross-country database de-
scribed in Rama and Artecona (2002). This dataset includes 121 countries. Figures
are reported for ￿ve-year period averages, from 1945-49 to 1995-1999. Our ￿ve
variables of interest are classi￿ed into two broad categories: (1) trade unions and
collective bargaining, and (2) labor standards. In the ￿rst category, we use the fol-
lowing variables10 : total trade union membership, in percentage of the total labor
force (TUMMBR) and workers covered by collective bargaining agreements, in per-
centage of total salaried or dependent workers (TUCVGE). In the labor standard
category, we use: cumulative number of ILO (International Labor Organization)
conventions rati￿ed by the country (ILOCNV); rati￿cation of the ILO convention
on the right of workers and employers to establish associations or organizations of
￿ ows, the fraction of host countries￿natives that speak English, and whether the legal system is
similar to the US one, as transaction costs might be reduced when speaking the same language or
sharing the same legal system.
9 All tables are in the appendix.
10 We refer to Rama and Artecona (2002) for a detailed explanation of the variables.Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI 63
their own, without government interference, and to a¢ liate with similar associa-
tions at the international level (ORGNZE); and rati￿cation of ILO convention on
the right to bargain collectively (BRGAIN). To build our cross-section dataset, we
took averages for the last two periods: 1990-1994 and 1995-1999 for the 56 countries
for which we have data on US direct investment.
The third source of data is an extended version of the cross-section described
in the book by Persson and Tabellini (2003). Their data set is used to study
the relation between constitutional rules and policy outcomes across democracies.
Therefore, it has variables describing economic performance (e.g. GDP per capita,
human capital), economic policy (openness, government consumption, protection of
property rights), forms of democracy and political institutions (dummy variables for
democracy, majoritarian democracy, presidential democracy), protection of property
rights, and other country characteristics (continental location, colonial origin, legal
origin). We extended their dataset to also include non-democracies. Variables are
collected for as many countries as possible on an annual basis. A detailed description
of the variables follows:
Protection of Property Rights. The primary source for the next ￿ve variables
is Knack and Keefer (1995).
CORRUPTION ￿Variable ￿Corruption in Government￿from the International
Country Risk Guide. Lower scores indicate ￿high government o¢ cials are likely
to demand special payments￿ and that ￿illegal payments are generally expected
throughout lower levels of government￿in the form of ￿bribes connected with import
and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans.￿
The variable runs from 0 to 10.
RULE OF LAW (named ￿Law and Order Tradition￿in ICRG) ￿This variable
￿re￿ ects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the es-
tablished institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes.￿Higher
scores indicate: ￿sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions
for an orderly succession of power.￿Lower scores indicate: ￿a tradition of depending
on physical force or illegal means for settling claims.￿Upon changes in government
new leaders ￿may be less likely to accept the obligations of the previous regime.￿
The variable runs from 0 to 10.
REPUDIATION (Risk of Repudiation of Contracts by Government) ￿￿This64 Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI
indicator addresses the possibility that foreign businesses, contractors, and consul-
tants face the risk of a modi￿cation in a contract taking the form of a repudiation,
postponement, or scaling down￿due to ￿an income drop, budget cutbacks, indig-
enization pressure, a change in government, or a change in government economic
and social priorities.￿Lower scores signify ￿a greater likelihood that a country will
modify or repudiate a contract with a foreign business.￿The variable runs from 0
to 10.
EXPROPRIATION (Risk of Expropriation of Private Investment) ￿This vari-
ables evaluates the risk of ￿outright con￿scation and forced nationalization￿of prop-
erty. Lower ratings ￿are given to countries where expropriation of private foreign
investment is a likely event.￿The variable runs from 0 to 10.
GADP ￿index of government￿ s anti-diversion policies. It is an equal-weighted
average of these ￿ve categories: i) law and order, ii) bureaucratic quality, iii) cor-
ruption, iv) risk of expropriation and v) government repudiation of contracts (each
of these items has higher values for governments with more e⁄ective policies towards
supporting production) and ranges from zero to one.
Economic Performance.
GDPPC ￿Real GDP per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars (Constant price: Chain
series). Primary source: Penn World Table 6.1
POPULATION ￿Source: Penn World Table 6.1, in thousands.
TRADE ￿sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share
of GDP. Source: The World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators 2002.
CG ￿ central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, constructed
using the item Government Finance ￿Expenditures in the IFS, divided by GDP at
current prices and multiplied by 100. Source: IMF/IFS
HUMANCAPITAL ￿Follows Hall and Jones (1999) with data from Barro and
Lee (2000).
Constitutional Variables.
MAJ ￿dummy variable for electoral systems. Equals 1 if the entire lower house
is elected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house)
are considered. Source: see Persson and Tabellini (2003)
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regimes, 0 otherwise. Only regimes where the con￿dence of the assembly is not
necessary for the executive (even if an elected president is not the chief executive,
or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes. Most
semi-presidential and premier-presidential systems are classi￿ed as parliamentary.
Source: see Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Other Country Characteristics.
LAAM ￿regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Latin America,
Central America or the Caribbeans, 0 otherwise.
OECD ￿dummy variable, equal to 1 for all countries that were members of
OECD before 1993, 0 otherwise, except for Turkey coded as 0, even though it was
a member of OECD before the 1990s.
AFRICA ￿ regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Africa, 0
otherwise.
ASIAE ￿regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in East Asia, 0
otherwise.
ENGFRAC ￿the fraction of the population speaking English as a native lan-
guage. Source: Hall and Jones (1999).
LEGOR_UK ￿dummy variables for the origin of the legal system, classifying
a country￿ s legal system into Anglo-Saxon Common Law. Source: La Porta et al.
(1998).
Table 3.2 brings the summary statistics for the main variables used in the re-
gressions:
5 Empirical results
5.1 Protection of Property Rights
The empirical analysis ￿nds substantial evidence of di⁄erential e⁄ects of the de-
gree of protection of property rights on FDI composition. In Table 3.3, we report
the results of regressions with country ￿xed e⁄ects and only interactions between
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quality. We ￿nd strong negative e⁄ects of a deterioration of the protection of prop-
erty rights on R&D intensive investment, but a positive e⁄ect on capital intensive
investment. As said previously, these regressions provide accurate results under the
strong assumption that there are no other country characteristic with a di⁄erential
e⁄ect on FDI composition. We lift this assumption and ￿nd (see Table 3.4) that all
interaction terms between capital intensity and measures of protection of property
rights become insigni￿cant. R&D intensive investment is still negatively a⁄ected
by a lower protection of property rights. For example, an increase of one standard
deviation in CORRUPTION reduces R&D intensive FDI (one standard deviation
above its mean) by 54.3%11 . For the variable GADP, an average of all measures
of protection of property rights, a deterioration of one standard deviation reduces
R&D intensive investment by 47.9%.
This is an extremely important result. Not only does corruption, and other
measures of a country￿ s protection of property rights, deter aggregate FDI ￿ ows, but
there is a signi￿cant reduction in the technological content of incoming ￿ ows. These
results are in contrast to those of Smarzynska and Wei (2000), who ￿nd no signi￿cant
interaction between corruption and technological sophistication (measured both at
the ￿rm and the industry level). While theirs is a model of the decision to invest
or not, using micro data, ours is a macro result: we see how capital ￿ ows from the
U.S. to a series of countries are a⁄ected by the degree of protection of property
rights in these countries. Both sets of results should then be seen as addressing
di⁄erent questions and thus, complementing each other. Finally, Table 3.5 shows
that the results remain similar in size and signi￿cance after dropping the country
￿xed e⁄ects and controlling for country characteristics. In the table, we only report
the interaction coe¢ cients of interest.
5.2 Labor standards
Given that our previous analysis showed that some country characteristics might
have a di⁄erential e⁄ect on FDI composition, we directly report the results of the
country ￿xed e⁄ects regression that includes these interaction terms. The results are
11 The coe¢ cient is positive because CORRUPTION is measured in such a way that higher
values imply lower levels of corruption. The same holds for all other measures of protection of
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reported in Table 3.6. There is a strong negative e⁄ect of unionization on both cap-
ital intensity and R&D intensity of ￿ ows. Both interaction terms are negative when
we measure unionization by the dummy ORGNZE, and by membership TUMMBR.
Rati￿cation of ILO convention 87 on the right to organize reduces capital intensive
FDI by 53.4% and R&D intensive FDI by 60.8%. An increase of a standard devia-
tion in total trade union membership decreases capital intensive foreign investment
by 34.6%. The e⁄ects of collective bargaining on FDI composition are less robust.
Rati￿cation of ILO convention 98 on the right to bargain collectively only has a
signi￿cant e⁄ect on R&D intensive foreign investment. This is reduced by 48.3%
when a country has rati￿ed this convention, i.e. when BRGAIN = 1. But there is no
e⁄ect on capital intensity FDI, and no e⁄ect of the coverage of collective bargaining
agreements (TUCVGE) on either measure of FDI composition. Given that we ex-
pected to see two opposite forces at work, one increasing capital and R&D intensive
FDI, and the other decreasing them, it is no surprise that the estimates are mostly
insigni￿cant. Finally, we follow Rodrik (1996) and check whether the total number
of ILO conventions rati￿ed by a country has a di⁄erential e⁄ect on FDI composi-
tion. We ￿nd negative results, thus we conclude that labor standards do not have a
cumulative e⁄ect on the capital and R&D intensity of foreign investment, but what
is of importance is the type of conventions that are rati￿ed.
These results extend the ￿ndings of Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005).
They show that labor market ￿ exibility increases aggregate FDI ￿ ows. While they
also report that FDI in services is more a⁄ected than in manufactures, their inter-
pretation of this being due to services being more labor intensive might be wrong.
In fact, the converse is true in our sample. As can be calculated from table 3.1, cap-
ital intensity in services (0.33) is higher than in manufactures (0.25). Our results
should be interpreted as indicating not that higher labor costs deter labor intensive
investment, but that a higher bargaining power for labor deters capital and R&D
intensive investment. By allowing labor to better appropriate part of the economic
rents of a project, higher bargaining power deters the most productive investments.
And these are the more capital and R&D intensive ones.68 Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI
5.3 Constitutional arrangements
The last series of regressions we perform relate to two constitutional features of
host countries: whether the form of government is presidential or parliamentary,
and whether the electoral system is proportional or majoritarian. In the regressions
reported in table 3.8, we can see no signi￿cant e⁄ect of the electoral system on either
capital or R&D intensive foreign investment. For presidential regimes, there is a
signi￿cant negative e⁄ect in the technological content of capital ￿ ows. Countries
with a presidential regime receive almost 50% less R&D intensive research than
parliamentary countries.
Although the evidence is not very strong, this result supports Persson￿ s (2004)
￿ndings that parliamentary and proportional democracies are better at promoting
structural policies that lead to sustained long-run economic growth. In developing
countries, FDI might be the most important way of incorporating new technologies,
and thus increase their growth perspective. Thus, our result indicates that one of
the forms in which presidential regimes reduce growth is by being unable to deliver
policies attracting technologically intensive capital ￿ ows.
6 Conclusions
In the last twenty years, there has been an increase in the ￿ ows of FDI into devel-
oping countries. As these countries become wealthier, these ￿ ows have diversi￿ed
away from the extraction of natural resources and into the production of consumer
products for their local markets. Thus, there is reverse causality in that FDI goes
to richer countries and, at the same time, provides these countries with the capital
and technology that allow them to become richer. In this paper, we have focused on
these second channels, and tried to throw some light on how host country institutions
a⁄ected the capital and R&D content of capital in￿ ows.
We saw that there are important e⁄ects of the protection of property rights on
the technological content of foreign investment. Better protection of property rights
results in FDI being more concentrated in technologically intensive sectors. This
result strengthens the case of having an investment friendly environment, by showing
that otherwise not only aggregate capital ￿ ows will be reduced, but there will be a
deterioration in the technological content of incoming ￿ ows. We also saw that thereChapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI 69
is evidence that giving more power to workers results in a decrease in capital and
R&D intensive foreign investment. We do not advice developing countries to reduce
workers￿rights, but make the point that a strengthening of workers￿power should
be done hand in hand with other measures compensating the negative e⁄ects on the
technological content of foreign investment.
Finally, we found partial evidence of presidential regimes failing, as compared
with parliamentary ones, in delivering policies attracting technologically intensive
FDI. The reason for this might be that the con￿dence requirement inherent in par-
liamentary arrangements helps producing a more stable and broad legislation, for
example, better protection of property rights.
We intend to explore the link between protection of property rights, and the size
and composition of FDI in more detail. We are constructing a larger data set with
more time, country, and industry variation to see the two channels more clearly:
from protection of property rights to FDI and from constitutional arrangements to
protection of property rights.70 Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDIBibliography
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Appendix
A1 Tables





Manufacturing: Food 0.236 0.151
Manufacturing: Chemicals 0.273 1.257
Manufacturing: Primary and fabricated metals 0.208 0.190
Manufacturing: Machinery 0.276 0.984
Manufacturing: Computer and electronic products 0.299 1.603
Manufacturing: Electrical eq. appliances and components 0.221 0.758
Manufacturing: Transportation equipment 0.290 0.638
Wholesale trade 0.358 0.259
Information 0.684 0.094
Financial (except depositary institutions and insurance) 0.165 0.018
Professional, scienti￿cal, and technical services 0.146 0.691
Other industries 0.259 0.025
Source: BEA (2005)Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI 75
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
USFDI 157.18 727.4 -800 13619.2
CORRUPTION 6.93 2.09 3.33 10
EXPROPRIATION 9.17 0.91 6.15 10
REPUDIATION 8.57 1.21 5.59 10
RULE OF LAW 7.71 2.04 2.46 10
GADP 0.75 0.18 0.41 1
ORGNZE 0.75 0.42 0 1
BRGAIN 0.77 0.41 0 1
TUMMBR 26.87 20.9 0 85.3
TUCVGE 56.62 28.6 3.7 95
ILOCNV 54.29 28.9 4 124.4
MAJ 0.29 0.44 0 1
PRES 0.38 0.49 0 1
POPULATION 81897 211437 262.9 1189411
GDPPC 12772.6 7731.3 982.9 32785.9
HUMANCAPITAL 2.46 0.46 1.67 3.25
TRADE 73.54 54.75 17.57 355.1
CG 13.89 6.83 5.52 29.5
OECD 0.46 0.48 0 1
LAAM 0.23 0.42 0 1
ASIAE 0.14 0.35 0 1
AFRICA 0.05 0.23 0 1
ENGFRAC 0.11 0.28 0 1
LEGOR_UK 0.29 0.45 0 176 Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI
In all the regressions, LOGFDI is the dependent variable and standard errors
are in parenthesis: *signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Table 3.3: Protection of Property Rights





















capint 3.77 13.60** 7.99 4.47* 7.36**
(2.34) (6.91) (4.91) (2.61) (3.47)
rdcap -4.66*** -12.68** -10.65*** -5.22*** -8.12***
(1.66) (5.11) (3.46) (1.88) (2.48)
constant -4.22*** -4.40** 2.22 -0.70 2.22
(2.01) (2.15) (1.86) (1.93) (1.89)
N. obs. 655 655 655 655 655
Censored obs. 230 230 230 230 230
Pseudo. R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Other controls always included: country dummiesChapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI 77
Table 3.4: Protection of property rights and Economic Performance





















capint 15.56 15.00 23.57** 16.67 15.63
(11.10) (10.67) (10.98) (11.46) (12.48)
rdcap -9.30 -15.02** -9.86 -11.25 -1.33
(7.77) (7.55) (7.79) (7.99) (8.60)
constant 1.61 4.71*** 5.10*** 1.90 4.92***
(1.16) (1.49) (1.49) (1.19) (1.48)
N. Obs. 611 611 611 611 611
Censored Obs. 226 226 226 226 226
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Other controls always included: country dummies, capint*log(population),
rdcap*log(population), capint*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade,
rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rdcap*cg, capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital78 Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI
Table 3.5: Protection of Property Rights, no country dummies































capint 13.03 12.04 23.66* 14.33 11.98
(12.63) (11.77) (12.43) (12.74) (14.62)
rdcap -11.80 -16.65** -9.45 -14.86* -1.82
(8.56) (8.36) (8.88) (8.84) (9.73)
constant -31.42*** -30.04*** -38.40*** -31.42*** -36.63***
(8.68) (8.44) (8.97) (8.86) (9.87)
N. obs. 584 584 584 584 584
Censored obs. 210 210 210 210 210
Pseudo. R2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
Other controls always included: log(population), log(gdppc), humancapital, trade,
cg, oecd, laam, asiae, africa, engfrac, legor_uk, capint*log(population),
rdcap*log(population), capint*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade,
rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rdcap*cg, capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital.Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI 79
Table 3.6: Labor Market Indicators





















capint 23.43** 18.87* 13.82 19.86 16.97*
(10.89) (10.49) (10.42) (15.29) (10.21)
rdcap -12.85* -14.43* -16.72** -12.03 -17.42**
(7.60) (7.50) (7.33) (10.59) (7.32)
constant 4.56*** 4.74*** -1.04 3.11** 4.69***
(1.49) (1.49) (1.32) (1.42) (1.49)
N. obs. 611 611 611 400 611
Censored obs. 226 226 226 142 226
Pseudo. R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Other controls always included: country dummies, capint*log(population),
rdcap*log(population), capint*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade,
rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rdcap*cg, capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital.80 Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI
Table 3.7: Labor Market Indicators, no country dummies































capint 21.35* 16.52 12.62 16.98 14.90
(11.96) (11.50) (11.26) (16.19) (11.15)
rdcap -14.79* -17.20** -19.98** -12.73 -20.42**
(8.37) (8.22) (8.01) (11.22) (8.05)
constant -37.40*** -29.51*** -28.31*** -27.84** -28.68***
(8.64) (8.30) (8.09) (11.29) (8.12)
N. obs. 584 584 584 387 584
Censored obs. 210 210 210 136 210
Pseudo. R2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Other controls always included: log(population), log(gdppc), humancapital, trade,
cg, oecd, laam, asiae, africa, engfrac, legor_uk, capint*log(population),
rdcap*log(population), capint*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade,
rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rdcap*cg, capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital.Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDI 81
Table 3.8: Constitutional Arrangements













capint 7.85 11.16 2.16 5.96
(11.03) (11.12) (12.07) (12.46)
rdcap -14.99** -9.21 -17.17** -11.31
(7.00) (7.61) (7.67) (8.46)
constant 4.56*** 1.50 -24.70*** -28.52***
(1.48) (1.15) (8.22) (8.59)
country dummies Yes Yes No No
other characteristics No No Yes Yes
N. obs. 608 608 581 581
Censored obs. 225 225 209 209
Pseudo. R2 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07
Other characteristics: log(population), log(gdppc), humancapital, trade, cg, oecd,
laam, asiae, africa, engfrac, legor_uk
Other controls always included: capint*log(population), rdcap*log(population), cap-
int*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade, rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rdcap*cg,
capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital82 Chapter 3. Determinants of Capital and R&D Intensive FDIChapter 4
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We examine the potential importance of consumers￿ambiguity aversion in the con-
text of macroeconomic ￿ uctuations: we ask how consumers price risky ￿ uctuations
and how the ￿ uctuations in￿ uence consumer welfare. Ambiguity aversion, which
is a way of formalizing preferences that are consistent with the Ellsberg paradox,
captures a form of violation of Savage￿ s axioms of subjective probability. Instead,
consumers behave as if a range of probability distributions are possible and as if they
are averse toward the ￿unknown￿ . With the typical parameterized representation
of ambiguity aversion, consumers have minmax preferences, thus maximizing utility
based on the worst possible belief within some given set of feasible beliefs. Thus,
in an economy with a small amount of randomness, there are ￿rst-order e⁄ects on
utility if there is ambiguity about this randomness. Thus, ambiguity aversion is in
contrast to the standard model, where risk aversion leads to second-order e⁄ects on
utility.
￿ This is a joint work with Irasema Alonso. We are grateful to Per Krusell for very helpful
comments. We also thank participants in seminars and conferences at IIES, University of Pittsburg,
the 2005 Society of Economic Dynamics Meeting, the 2006 North American Summer Meeting of
the Econometric Society. We are thankful to Christina L￿nnblad for editorial assistance. Financial
support from Jan Wallander￿ s and Tom Hedelius￿Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
All errors are, of course, ours.
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The ￿rst step in our work is to look at asset pricing in a simple Mehra-Prescott-
style endowment economy. Here, we demonstrate how larger equity premia can
be obtained by assuming ambiguity aversion, along with low riskfree rates. The
key parameter in the model is the amount of ambiguity aversion, but it interacts
nonlinearly with other parameters, such as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
There is no direct evidence of which we are aware that allows us to calibrate the
ambiguity parameter, but we show a range of calibrations that roughly match the
average returns on risky and riskless assets.1
The second step of the work is to ask how consumers assess the ￿ uctuations from
a welfare point of view. Thus, we redo the Lucas (2003)-style calculation whereby
it is asked by how much the representative-consumer utility would rise (expressed
as a permanent increase in consumption) if all ￿ uctuations around the trend were
eliminated. The answer, in the economy with ambiguity, naturally depends on the
amount of ambiguity: since ambiguity is a form of ￿worry￿about random ￿ uctua-
tions, the elimination of the randomness would eliminate the worry, and consumers
would be better o⁄ as a result. Here, we use asset prices as a way of calibrating the
ambiguity parameter. That is, we use the ￿rst step in our work as a calibration,
and then do the Lucas (2003) calculation based on it. We ￿nd the welfare costs to
be of the order of magnitude of 15% of consumption. This is a huge number (Lucas
found about a tenth on 1%), and it is accounted for by allowing larger risk aversion
and introducing ambiguity aversion.
In assessing how ambiguity might be important in the economy, it seems relevant
to consider whether there is heterogeneity in the extent to which di⁄erent consumers
are ambiguity-averse. The third part of our paper examines how heterogeneity in
ambiguity aversion in￿ uences wealth distribution, and thus indirectly asset pricing,
since consumers￿in￿ uence on prices operates through (is ￿weighted by￿ ) their wealth
holdings. We consider a simple case and assume that half of the agents display
a given amount of ambiguity aversion while the rest (the ￿standard agents￿ ) do
not. We specialize to a logarithmic period utility function and iid and symmetric
shocks. For this particular case, we are able to show that the standard agents
will increasingly dominate in the pricing of the assets over time. Furthermore,
with this heterogeneity, the most ambiguity-averse agents become (almost) non-
1 For a survey on the equity premium puzzle, see Kocherlakota (1996).Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 85
participants in the stock market over time; thus, we obtain endogenous limited
participation. In conclusion, although ambiguity aversion shows great potential in
providing new asset-pricing implications and in allowing us to think of a reason why
the elimination of aggregate ￿ uctuations might be quite costly, heterogeneity in the
degree of ambiguity aversion will tend to limit these implications and mainly have
e⁄ects on wealth distribution and the di⁄erences in portfolios across consumers.
2 The economy
This is an in￿nite-horizon exchange economy. Production is exogenous: the economy
has a tree that pays dividends every period. The dividend grows at a random rate,
which has a two-state support given by (￿1;￿2) and follows a ￿rst-order Markov
process. The transition probabilities are given by ￿ss0 ￿the probability of going to
state s0 if today￿ s state is s, with s;s0 = 1;2.




￿11 ￿ v1 ￿12 + v1
￿21 ￿ v2 ￿22 + v2
￿
; (4.1)
where vs 2 [￿a;a] (s = 1;2) with restrictions on a such that all probabilities are in
[0;1]. Parameter a measures the amount of ambiguity in the economy.











where c is consumption, u(c) is the period utility function, and ￿st is a set of
transition probability laws given the history st today.
Aversion to ambiguity is captured by the ￿minimization￿ part in the utility
formulation above: the consumer behaves with pessimism, i.e., he assumes the worst
possible probability distribution. For an axiomatic foundation for this preference
formulation, see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for the static setting and Epstein
and Wang (1994) and Epstein and Schneider (2003) for a multiperiod setting.
In section 3 we describe the model with a representative agent and in section
4 we look at the welfare costs of consumption variability. Finally, in section 5 we
consider a model with both ambiguity-averse agents and ￿standard￿agents who do86 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles
not view the economy as ambiguous.
3 Representative-agent asset pricing
In this section and for simplicity, we ￿rst consider an ambiguity-averse representative
agent with a logarithmic period utility function and discount factor ￿. In addition,
we ￿rst assume that shocks are iid and symmetric, i.e., ￿ss0 = 0:5. After that,
we consider a CRRA period utility function and assume serially correlated shocks.
Then, we calibrate the economy and report the model￿ s performance.
There is an equity share that is competitively traded and a riskless bond that
is in zero net supply. We denote the consumer￿ s bond and equity holdings b and e,
respectively.
The representative agent holds the tree and thus, his consumption in every period
is the dividend of the tree. A log-period utility function together with the assumption
of iid shocks imply that p, the price of the tree, will be linear in d, the dividend,
and independent of the state: p(d) = ^ pd.
The ambiguity-averse consumer puts a higher weight on the bad outcome than
what is warranted by the objective probability; that is, he becomes pessimistic
because he is worried about that outcome and does not know its probability.
We assume that ￿1 > ￿2 so that the bad outcome is state 2 ￿the outcome where
the dividend is low. The objective probability of this state is 0.5, but he chooses
the belief in the bad state. His belief is ￿(v) = 0:5 ￿ v and he chooses v from the
set v 2 [￿a;a]. The higher is a, the more ambiguity there is in the economy.
The problem of the representative agent with wealth today given by w is
V (w) = max
e log[w ￿ p(d)e] + ￿ min
v2[￿a;a]
(￿ ￿ v)V (w
0










2 = [￿2d + p(d￿2)]e:
Here, for ease of notation, we have excluded the bond (since bond holdings must
be zero in equilibrium). Moreover, the budget constraint: c + p(d)e + q(d)b = wChapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 87
where w = [d + p(d)]e￿1 +b￿1 (e￿1 and b￿1 are equity and bond holdings chosen in
the previous period) has been substituted away. The Euler equation for equity is
p(d)u
0(d) =
￿ f(￿ ￿ a)[￿1d + p(￿1d)]u
0(￿1d) + (1 ￿ ￿ + a)[￿2d + p(￿2d)]u
0(￿2d)g: (4.3)
Clearly, p is linear in d (a constant times d), whenever u0(c) = c￿￿ (here, ￿ = 1).
Since the period utility is logarithmic, the price of equity does not depend on beliefs
because the payo⁄ and the inverse of marginal utility (u0) are proportional to ￿d so
that the payo⁄times marginal utility is the same in both states. Thus, p(d) =
￿
1￿￿d
solves the Euler equation above: the price of equity is independent of ￿ and a.






1￿￿, then V (w0
1) >
V (w0
2), so the solution for v is a corner, i.e., v = a. In section 5, we show that v can
be an interior solution when the economy is populated by both ambiguity-averse
and standard consumers.
The Euler equation for bonds similarly gives
q(d)u
0(d) = ￿ f(￿ ￿ a)u
0(￿1d) + (1 ￿ ￿ + a)u
0(￿2d)g: (4.4)


















The higher is a ￿the more ambiguity aversion there is in the economy ￿the higher
is the belief that the bad state will happen, and the higher is the present value of
one unit tomorrow, since the probability weight placed on the state with a high
marginal utility is higher.
The expected return on equity, ERe, is given by
ERe =
￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
￿
; (4.6)
and it is independent of the belief. The return on bonds, Rb, decreases when ambi-
guity aversion increases, because Rb = 1
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The equity premium in this economy is
ERe ￿ Rb =




￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)￿1 + ￿￿2 + a(￿1 ￿ ￿2)]
: (4.7)
If we make ￿ = 0:5, then the equity premium in this economy is





￿ [0:5(￿1 + ￿2) + a(￿1 ￿ ￿2)]
: (4.8)





Using ￿1 = 1:02, ￿2 = 1:01; and ￿ = 0:98, the equity premium is 0:5%, which
is 200 times larger than the equity premium for the same parameter values when
a = 0 ￿the standard model. Although this is an example, and not a calibration, it
illustrates that the e⁄ect of ambiguity on asset prices/returns can be substantial.
If the period utility is u(d) = d1￿￿




















We now assume that the period utility is u(c) = c1￿￿
1￿￿ and the shocks are serially
correlated.
The problem of the representative agent with wealth today given by w and
today￿ s shock s is
Vs(w) = max










1 = [￿1d + p1(d￿1)]e;
w
0
2 = [￿2d + p2(d￿2)]e:
The Euler equation for equity is
ps(d)u
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￿ f(￿s1 ￿ vs)[￿1d + p1(￿1d)]u
0(￿1d) + (￿s2 + vs)[￿2d + p2(￿2d)]u
0(￿2d)g (4.10)
The price of equity is still linear in d, and is now given by






1 (1 + k1) + (￿s2 + vs)￿
1￿￿
2 (1 + k2)
￿
; (4.12)
for s = 1;2.










+ ￿(￿12 + a)￿
1￿￿
2 + ￿
2(￿12 + a)(￿21 ￿ a)(￿1￿2)1￿￿
￿




















+ ￿(￿21 ￿ a)￿
1￿￿
1 + ￿
2(￿21 ￿ a)(￿12 + a)(￿1￿2)1￿￿
￿









2(￿12 + a)(￿21 ￿ a)(￿1￿2)1￿￿
Thus, wealth in the next period is:
w
0




2 = ￿2d(1 + k2): (4.14)


























for s = 1;2.




￿s1 [￿1d + p1(￿1d)] + ￿s2 [￿2d + p2(￿2d)]
ps(d)
￿ 1 (4.16)
for s = 1;2, and the unconditional expected return on equity ERe, is
￿ER
e
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)ER
e
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where the invariant probability ￿ solves













￿11￿1(1 + k1) + ￿12￿2(1 + k2)
k1
+ (1 ￿ ￿)














































5 ￿ 1: (4.20)




3.2 Calibration and evaluation of asset prices
As in Mehra and Prescott (1985), we now select the parameters of the model so
that the average growth rate of per capita consumption, the standard deviation of
the growth rate of per capita consumption and the ￿rst-order serial correlation of
this growth rate, all with respect to the model￿ s stationary distribution, match the
sample values for the U.S. economy between 1889-1978.
The values of the parameters are ￿ = 0:43 (where ￿11 = ￿22 = ￿ and ￿12 = ￿21 =
(1 ￿ ￿)), ￿1 = 1:054, and ￿2 = 0:982.
Figure 4.1 shows the return on the risk-free bond, the expected return on equity
and the equity premium for ￿ = 0:95, a = 0:2, and for a range of ￿ between 0 and
10.
The equity premium is higher as ￿ increases. Note, for example, that for ￿ =Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 91
8, the risk-free return is 4:72%, the expected return on equity is 8:77%, and the
resulting equity premium is 4:05%.
Figure 4.2 shows the return on the risk-free asset, the expected return on equity,
and the equity premium for ￿ = 0:95, ￿ = 2, and the ambiguity parameter a in a
range between 0 and 0.43.
The equity premium increases with the amount of ambiguity in the economy.
For example, for a = 0:3, the return on the bond is 4:27%, the expected return on
equity is 6:98%, and the resulting equity premium is 2:71%. As a comparison, the
largest equity premium that Mehra and Prescott (1985) were able to obtain was
0:35%.














Figure 4.1: Return on equity, risk-free return, and the equity premium as a function
of the risk aversion parameter (￿)92 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles















Figure 4.2: Return on equity, risk-free return, and the equity premium as a function
of the ambiguity aversion parameter (a)
4 Potential bene￿ts of eliminating consumption
￿ uctuations
We ￿rst calculate the costs of consumption ￿ uctuations when shocks are iid: The








[￿V (￿1d) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿2d)]
￿
: (4.21)
The solution for V (d) is
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Eliminating consumption ￿ uctuations will deliver the present value of total utility
corresponding to consuming the expected value of the dividend every period. This













1 ￿ ￿ [￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿2]
1￿￿￿: (4.24)
The costs of consumption variability are given by ￿ where ￿ solves:
(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿











Calculating the utility of the deterministic growth path is more evolving when
the shocks are serially correlated. To this end, we will now introduce some notation.


























The ￿rst row of this expression, ￿
e
t, is the expected growth rate between now and t
periods from now if the state now is state 1; and the second row, ￿
e
t, is the expected


















The utility of the deterministic growth path, where growth is equal to the ex-94 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles
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1 (￿21 ￿ ￿11)
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿









2(￿21 ￿ a)(￿12 + a)(￿1￿2)1￿￿￿:






































Figure 4.3 plots the costs of business cycles for ￿ = 0:9, and ￿ = 2 as a function
of a; i.e., it shows a ￿comparative-statics￿exercise with respect to the ambiguity
parameter only.
Clearly, more ambiguity aversion increases the costs of business cycles. By elim-
inating ￿ uctuations (if that is possible), the government would eliminate the ￿rst-
order negative e⁄ect on utility that consumers experience from random consumption.
We continue with comparative statics with respect to various parameters andChapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 95










Figure 4.3: Costs of business cycles as a function of the ambiguity-aversion parame-
ter (a)
then ￿nally describe the welfare costs when the parameters are selected to match
the asset prices.
Figure 4.4 shows the costs of business cycles for ￿ = 0:7, and a = 0:1 as a function
of ￿. Consumption ￿ uctuations hurt more the more risk averse is a consumer.
However, this result is not true for very high values of ￿ or very high values of a.
Finally, ￿gure 4.5 plots the costs of business cycles for ￿ = 2 and a = 0:2 as a
function of ￿.96 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles













Figure 4.4: Cost of business cycles as a function of the risk-aversion parameter (￿)
We now look at the costs of ￿ uctuations when the asset prices match the data.
As was discussed brie￿ y above, this can be accomplished in di⁄erent ways, and each
of these is associated with a di⁄erent cost. Table 4.1 illustrates that the welfare
costs￿ or, rather, the potential welfare costs￿ of cycles are huge. They do not di⁄er
markedly across the di⁄erent parameter con￿gurations.
Table 4.1: Costs of business cycles for selected parameters and a > 0
￿ ￿ a ERe ￿ Rb ￿1 ￿2
0.95 13.74 0.2040 6.18% 12.48% 12.46%
0.94 13.36 0.2223 6.18% 12.88% 12.86%
0.93 12.95 0.2420 6.18% 13.32% 13.30%
0.92 12.46 0.2642 6.18% 13.86% 13.85%
0.91 11.98 0.2879 6.18% 14.43% 14.41%
0.90 11.37 0.3160 6.18% 15.19% 15.17%
0.89 10.70 0.3480 6.18% 16.06% 16.05%
0.88 9.83 0.3890 6.18% 17.33% 17.32%
0.873 8.94 0.4300 6.18% 18.76% 18.75%
Finally, for comparison, we show the associated costs for a = 0. These are
also high compared to Lucas￿(2003) numbers, since ￿ is high, but of an order of
magnitude lower than above.Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 97













Figure 4.5: Cost of business cycles as a function of the subjective discount factor
(￿)
Table 4.2: Costs of business cycles for selected parameters and a = 0
￿ ￿ a Rb ERe ￿ Rb ￿1 ￿2
0.95 13.74 0 19.49% 4.40% 2.55% 2.53%
0.94 13.36 0 20.67% 4.25% 2.41% 2.39%
0.93 12.95 0 21.85% 4.08% 2.28% 2.26%
0.92 12.46 0 23.01% 3.88% 2.15% 2.13%
0.91 11.98 0 24.16% 3.68% 2.02% 2.01%
0.90 11.37 0 25.25% 3.43% 1.89% 1.88%
0.89 10.70 0 26.27% 3.15% 1.76% 1.75%
0.88 9.83 0 27.12% 2.80% 1.62% 1.61%
0.873 8.94 0 27.42% 2.45% 1.50% 1.49%
5 Heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion
We now consider two types of agents whose ambiguity aversions di⁄er. We look at
a general planning problem ￿rst, and then focus on the case with iid shocks. Later,
we look at the case of serial correlation in more detail.98 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles
5.1 The planner￿ s problem
The state vector is (d;￿;s): today￿ s dividend, the weight the planner puts on con-
sumer 1, and today￿ s shock. The planner solves the problem
V (d;￿;s) = max
c1;c2;z1(s0);z2(s0)























0) + [1 ￿ ￿
0
s0]z2(s
0)g ￿ 0; (4.35)
and
c1 + c2 = d; (4.36)
where ci is agent i￿ s consumption, i = 1;2, and zi is next period￿ s present-value
utility for agent i. The ￿rst constraint (4.35) makes the problem recursive and the
second constraint (4.36) is the resource constraint. This formulation which is based
on Lucas and Stokey (1984) is also used in Alonso (2007).
Taking FOCs with respect to the consumption of agents 1 and 2, we have
c1 = ￿d; (4.37)
and
c2 = (1 ￿ ￿)d; (4.38)









(1 ￿ ￿)(￿s1 ￿ v2)
; (4.39)









(1 ￿ ￿)(￿s2 + v2)
: (4.40)
After some algebra, we can rewrite the planner￿ s problem asChapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 99
V (d;￿;s) = max
c1;c2;￿0
s0





















￿ss0 [￿v1 + (1 ￿ ￿)v2]
; (4.41)
and
c1 + c2 = d: (4.42)
Note that ￿ss0 [￿v1 + (1 ￿ ￿)v2] = ￿ss0￿￿v1￿(1￿￿)v2 if s0 = 1 and ￿ss0+￿v1+(1￿￿)v2
if s0 = 2.
5.1.1 A special case: no serial correlation and v2 = 0
In the simpler case where shocks are iid and symmetric and consumer 2 is not
ambiguity-averse (a2 = 0), the planner￿ s problem becomes:
V (d;￿) = max
c1;c2;￿0
s0


















c1 + c2 = d: (4.44)
Using the FOCs for consumption, we obtain c1 = ￿d and c2 = (1￿￿)d, so we get




v [(￿ ￿ ￿v)V (d￿1;￿
0
1) + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v)V (d￿2;￿
0












1 ￿ ￿ + v
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v
: (4.46)
Here, we conjecture that V (d;￿) takes the form Alogd + W(￿). This guess
delivers




v f(￿ ￿ ￿v)[Alog(d￿1) + W(￿
0
1)] + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v)[Alog(d￿2) + W(￿
0
2)]g:
Inspecting this functional equation, it can be seen that A = 1
1￿￿ works and we
























1 ￿ ￿ + v
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v
￿￿￿
:
This is a one-dimensional dynamic programming problem delivering optimal v
as a function of ￿ and hence, a law of motion for ￿. The variable ￿ also corresponds
to the fraction of the total wealth￿ the current dividend plus the value of the tree￿
owned by agent 1 in a complete-markets equilibrium. The following ￿gures for W(￿)
and v(￿) below assume the same values for the parameters as speci￿ed at the end
of section 3.
Figure 4.6, for W(￿), reveals a shape similar to log￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿, which is the
(constant) ￿ ow utility of a planner in a two-type economy where no consumer has
ambiguity aversion.
Figure 4.7, for the optimal choice of v, shows that v is close to zero and interior
at ￿rst (for small ￿￿ s), and then it increases monotonically in ￿ and reaches the
upper bound a for a value of ￿ a little above 0.9. We will interpret these ￿ndings in
more detail in the following sections.Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 101











Figure 4.6: Value function W(￿)













Figure 4.7: Policy function v (￿)102 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles
5.2 The special (iid) case: the decentralized economy
Markets are complete and consumers trade in equity shares of the tree and in a
riskless bond. The consumer￿ s problem is given recursively by
V (d;w;￿) = max
c;b;e
(











subject to the budget constraint
c + p(d;￿)e + q(d;￿)b = w; (4.47)
w
0
s0 = b + e[￿s0d + p(￿s0d;￿
0
s0)]; (4.48)





s0 = gs0(d;￿); (4.49)
where (d;w;￿) is the state vector. As before, w is the consumer￿ s wealth today, p
is the price of equity, e is the fraction of the equity share held by the consumer,
q is the price today of a bond that pays one unit of the consumption good next
period, and b is the holdings of the bond. (The argument d is included for g only
for completeness; it will not be there under the log assumption.)




for i 2 f1;2g.
Total wealth in the economy when the state variable is (d;￿) is d+p(d;￿). Thus,
market clearing requires, for all values of the arguments,
c1(d;￿[d + p(d;￿)];￿) + c2(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿) = d; (4.53)
b1(d;￿[d + p(d;￿)];￿) + b2(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿) = 0; (4.54)Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 103
and
e1(d;￿[d + p(d;￿)];￿) + e2(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿) = 1: (4.55)















2s0(d;￿) ￿ b2(d;(1￿￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿)+e2(d;(1￿￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿)(d￿s0+p[d￿s0;gs0(d;￿)]):
Now we will show how to ￿nd prices and portfolio allocations in this economy.
We use the planning problem and we identify the ￿ in that problem with the corre-
sponding variable here: the planning weight on agent 1 equals the relative fraction
of total wealth held in equilibrium by this agent.
















￿ ^ q(￿): (4.57)
As shown in section 3, the price of the bond is increasing in a. In addition here, the
price of bonds is increasing in ￿. We show below that the ambiguity-averse agents
demand the bond. The bond is more valuable when marginal utility of consumption
is high (which occurs in the bad state). As ￿ increases, there is a higher demand for
the bond, so its price goes up.
And the price of equity, p(d;￿), is given by
p(d;￿) = ￿
￿






















￿(1 ￿ ￿ + v)
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v
￿ ￿; (4.60)
from the planning problem. (The inequalities above follow since v ￿ 0.)
The latter laws of motion reveal that the ambiguity-averse agent gains in relative
wealth when the state is bad and loses when it is good: his probability ￿beliefs￿are
tilted toward the bad state.
We see that p(d;￿) = d^ p(￿) solves this equation, delivering
^ p(￿) = ￿ f(￿ ￿ ￿v)[1 + ^ p(￿
0
1)] + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v)[1 + ^ p(￿
0
2)]g: (4.61)
This is a functional equation: it holds for all ￿ (recall that v may also depend on ￿).










So the price of equity does not depend on ￿.
The equilibrium holdings of equity of consumer 1, which can be obtained by
using the expression for future wealth, w0
1s0 = b1 + e1(￿s0d + p0
s0), together with the












￿ ^ e1(￿): (4.64)
Thus, the equity holdings of agent 1 are independent of the level of d. We see that




2 = ￿, then ^ e1(￿) = ￿: the consumer￿ s share of the tree
equals his initial share of total wealth.
On the other hand, when v > 0 (recall that wlog we use ￿1 > ￿2), we know
that ￿
0
1 < ￿ < ￿
0
2, which makes the holdings of equity lower as compared to the
case when v = 0. That is, the ambiguity-averse agent will have a smaller share of
equity holdings than his overall wealth would otherwise prescribe: this is a portfolio
composition e⁄ect. How much his portfolio composition will be changed must be
numerically examined.Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 105
We can also examine the portfolio e⁄ect by looking at the amount of bonds






1 ￿ ^ e1(￿)]: (4.65)
It is interesting to note here that bond holdings are proportional to d. Naturally,
they are zero in the special case v = 0, when e1 = ￿ and ￿
0 = ￿. Moreover,
￿
0



























1, and thus we conclude, consistently with the above insights regarding
equity holdings, that the ambiguity-averse agent increases his bond holdings relative
to the v = 0 zero-bonds case: his portfolio composition moves away from equity and
into bonds because he is more pessimistic than person 2 in his perception of the
return (performance) of equity.
There are two sources of uncertainty in this economy: (i) the payo⁄ of equity
and (ii) the price of the bond. The price of the bond depends on ￿, the relative
wealth of consumer 1, and this variable is random. In particular, since ￿
0
2 > ￿ > ￿
0
1,
the price of the bond, q, increases if state 2 occurs and it decreases if state 1 occurs.







q(￿), and b(￿) for agent 1. Once more, the parameter values are ￿1 = 1:02, ￿2 = 1:01,
and ￿ = 0:98.
As we see from the graphs in ￿gure 4.8, the ambiguity-averse consumer short-
sells equity for most values of ￿. The reason for this is the following. State 2 is bad
for the ambiguity-averse consumer for two reasons: (i) the payo⁄from equity is low
and (ii) the price of the bond increases so that it makes the good next period more
expensive (this consumer does not own any goods next period). Therefore, to provide
protection against the former type of uncertainty, the ambiguity-averse consumer
buys bonds and to provide protection against the latter type of uncertainty, the
ambiguity-averse consumer sells equity short.106 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles

























































































Figure 4.8: From left to right from top to bottom: (a) v(￿), (b) law of motion for
￿ (￿1 below the 45 degree line; ￿2 above the 45 degree line), (c) e1(￿), (d) share of
equity of agent 1, (e) q(￿), (f) b(￿)
The behavior of the ambiguity-averse consumer can be separately described for
di⁄erent ranges of ￿. First, when ￿ is zero, the ambiguity-averse consumers have
zero aggregate wealth. In this case, the price of bonds is solely determined by the
￿standard￿agents and it does not ￿ uctuate. Since there is no uncertainty on q,
ambiguity-averse consumers only hold bonds. As shown in the below section, a very
small amount of pessimism rationalizes this choice.
If ￿ is positive but small, changes in ￿ do not have any considerable e⁄ects onChapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 107
q, so the randomness in q is not so important. Then, ambiguity-averse consumers
mainly hold bonds and short-sell equity somewhat to protect against the uncertainty










for a small value of the belief v; that is, v is still an interior solution.
When ￿ is high, ambiguity aversion makes the ￿ uctuations in q very large. Agents
buy bonds and short-sell equity more heavily. The value of v is larger, re￿ ecting
more pessimism about state 2. Since V is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in w (the
former is true because q is increasing in ￿), and since ￿
0




needs to be much larger than w0
1 in order to equate V (w0
1;￿
0




hence still make v an interior solution. This is achieved by short-selling equity even
more heavily.
When ￿ is very close to 1, v is a corner solution since the ambiguity-averse
agents need to hold most of the stock and they are pessimistic about state 1. The
￿ uctuations in ￿ have become very small, and the uncertainty resulting from changes
in q is therefore also very small and ambiguity-averse agents consequently do not
need to short-sell the stock.
5.3 Relative consumption and wealth in the long run
We can analytically show2 that
E(￿
0j￿) < ￿; (4.68)
i.e., that over time, the relative wealth of the ambiguity-averse agents decreases
toward zero: these agents disappear, economically speaking.








so the rate at which they disappear goes to zero: they remain with positive wealth
2 The proofs of expressions (4.68) and (4.69) are in the appendix. This result and the following
discussion are reminiscent of the analysis in Coen-Pirani (2004).108 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles
for a long, long time.
6 Conclusion
In this essay, we have studied asset pricing and evaluated the welfare costs of ￿ uctu-
ations in consumption for an economy where consumers are ambiguity-averse. First,
we have shown parameter con￿gurations under which the equity premium is quite
large (and the riskfree rate is small); the ability to match these return features comes
from the ability of ambiguity aversion to generate ￿rst-order e⁄ects on prices, which
sets it apart from risk aversion, which operates through second-order e⁄ects. Am-
biguity aversion has ￿rst-order e⁄ects, in essence, because consumers behave as if
they believed that the good return outcomes to be less likely than they really are.
Second, using the calibrations that deliver realistic asset prices, we have shown
that the welfare bene￿ts of eliminating consumption ￿ uctuations need not be as
small as those in Lucas￿ s (2003) calculations. This is not to say that the bene￿ts
are large: the numbers we obtain are, just like Lucas￿ s numbers, upper bounds, and
these upper bounds leave open what the costs of stabilization (say, in the form of
distortions) might be, and also leave open whether full stabilization is even feasible.
Nevertheless, it is valuable to note that these bounds can be as large as 15% of
consumption when asset prices are matched by the model.
Third, by exploring an economy where some consumers are ambiguity-averse and
others are not, we ￿nd an important quali￿cation to the above ￿ndings: it appears
that, by making consistently ￿bad bets￿ , ambiguity-averse consumers will see their
relative wealth decline over time, and thereby asset prices will be increasingly domi-
nated by standard consumers. Note also that these bad bets are not bad in the sense
of ￿crazy portfolios￿ , but simply in the sense of delivering a lower return on average
by not investing enough in stock. In particular, if ambiguity aversion is su¢ ciently
large, the ambiguity-averse consumers choose to not participate at all in the stock
market: the other, standard consumers hold all risk (and get all the high returns on
average).3 To make this wealth distribution not converge to an extreme outcome,
3 It is interesting to note that there is (close to) non-participation for a large range of values
for ￿. Thus, without having to assume that there are costs of transacting/investing in stock,
we can use this setting to derive conditions under which a large fraction of the population￿ the
ambiguity-averse￿ (almost) do not have any stock. This kind of result was also derived in EpsteinChapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 109
one could consider an overlapping-generations structure, where in each generation
of newborns with zero debt, some are ambiguity-averse; that way, a signi￿cant part
of aggregate wealth will always belong to ambiguity-averse consumers.
and Schneider￿ s (2007) work. Exact non-participation cannot be obtained here because the risk-
free rate ￿ uctuates with the endowment shock; because the ambiguity-averse agents hold bonds,
it is optimal for them to use equity to hedge against the interest-rate risk. This risk, however,
is very small for a large range of (low) values of ￿: when ￿ is zero, the risk-free rate is constant,
and thus not until the ambiguity-averse agents have a signi￿cant fraction of total wealth will these
￿ uctuations be large enough to induce signi￿cant equity holdings for these agents.110 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business CyclesBibliography
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Appendix
A1 Heterogeneity in ambigiuty aversion and serial correlation
The planning problem






















c1 + c2 = d: (4.71)
Using the FOCs for consumption, we obtain c1 = ￿d and c2 = (1￿￿)d so we get
























Here, we conjecture that Vs(d;￿) takes the form Alogd + Ws(￿). This guess
delivers





((￿s1 ￿ ￿vs)(Alog(d￿1) + W1(￿
0
1)) + (￿s2 + ￿vs)(Alog(d￿2) + W2(￿
0
2))):
Inspecting the above expression, it can be seen that A = 1
1￿￿ works and leaves
Ws(￿) = log￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
























for s = 1;2. This is a two-dimensional dynamic programming problem that delivers
optimal vs, s = 1;2, as a function of ￿, and hence a law of motion for ￿.
The decentralized economy














subject to the budget constraint
c + ps(d;￿)e + qs(d;￿)b = w; (4.74)
w
0
s0 = b + e[￿s0d + ps0(d￿s0;￿
0
s0)]; (4.75)





s0 = gs0(d;￿;s) (4.76)
where p is the price of equity, e is the fraction of the equity share held by the
consumer, q is the price today of a bond that pays one unit of the consumption
good next period, and b is the holdings of the bond. (The argument d is included
for g only for completeness; it will not be there under the log assumption.)




for i 2 f1;2g.
Total wealth in the economy when the state variable is (d;￿;s) is d + ps(d;￿).114 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles
Thus, market clearing requires, for all values of the arguments,
c1s(d;￿[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) + c2s(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) = d (4.80)
b1s(d;￿[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) + b2s(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) = 0 (4.81)
e1s(d;￿[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) + e2s(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) = 1; (4.82)















2s0(d;￿;s) ￿ b2s(d;(1￿￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿)+e2s(d;(1￿￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿)(d￿s0+ps0 [d￿s0;gs0(d;￿)])
Now, we will show how to ￿nd prices and portfolio allocations in this economy.
We use the planning problem and identify the ￿ in that problem with the corre-
sponding variable here: the planning weight on agent 1 equals the relative fraction
of total wealth held in equilibrium by this agent.

























We see that ps(d;￿) = d^ ps(￿) solves this equation, delivering
^ ps(￿) = ￿ f(￿s1 ￿ ￿v)[1 + ^ p1(￿
0
1)] + (￿s2 + ￿v)[1 + ^ p2(￿
0
2)]g (4.86)Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 115
This is a system of two functional equations.
Asset holdings are the following. First, his equilibrium holdings of bonds are








1 ￿ ^ e1s(￿)]
It is interesting to note here that bond holdings are proportional to d. Naturally,
they are zero in the special case v = 0, when e = ￿ and ￿
0 = ￿.
























2￿2 [1 + ^ p2(￿
0
2)]
￿1 [1 + ^ p1(￿
0
1)] ￿ ￿2 [1 + ^ p2(￿
0
2)]
￿ ^ e1s(￿) (4.87)
This is once more a system of two functional equations.
Neither bond holdings nor equity holdings depend directly on s, but they do
through the dependence of the ￿
0s on s.
The special case where ￿ = 0
We solve the problem for an ambiguity-averse agent who is measure zero in the
economy. This agent solves the problem
V (w;d) = max
c;b;e
u(c) + min
v ￿ [(￿ ￿ v)V (w
0




c + qb + pde = w (4.88)
w
0
1 = b + (￿1d + p￿1d)e (4.89)
w
0
2 = b + (￿2d + p￿2d)e (4.90)
The FOCs with respect to b are
qu
0(w ￿ qb + pde) =
= ￿ f(￿ ￿ v)u
0 [b + e￿1d(1 + p) ￿ qb
0 ￿ pd￿1e
0] + (1 ￿ ￿ + v)u
0 [b + e￿2d(1 + p) ￿ qb
0 ￿ pd￿2e
0]g116 Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles
and with respect to e, they are
pdu
0(w ￿ qb + pde) =
= ￿f(￿ ￿ v)u
0 [b + e￿1d(1 + p) ￿ qb
0 ￿ pd￿1e
0]￿1d(1 + p)+
+(1 ￿ ￿ + v)u
0 [b + e￿2d(1 + p) ￿ qb
0 ￿ pd￿2e
0]￿2d(1 + p)g




b + e￿1d(1 + p) ￿ qb0 ￿ pd￿1e0 +
1 ￿ ￿ + v








b + e￿1d(1 + p) ￿ qb0 ￿ pd￿1e0 +
(1 ￿ ￿ + v)￿2




b = ￿bw (4.91)
and






[￿b + ￿e￿1(1 + p)](1 ￿ q￿b ￿ p￿1￿e)
+
1 ￿ ￿ + v









[￿b + ￿e￿1(1 + p)](1 ￿ q￿b ￿ p￿1￿e)
+
(1 ￿ ￿ + v)￿2
[￿b + ￿e￿2(1 + p)](1 ￿ q￿b ￿ p￿2￿e)
￿
(1￿q￿b￿p￿e)
The problem of the consumer can be rewritten as
V (w) = max
c;b;e
logc + min
v ￿ [(￿ ￿ v)V (w
0




c + qb + p^ e = w (4.93)
w
0
1 = b + ^ e￿1(1 + p) (4.94)
w
0
2 = b + ^ e￿2(1 + p); (4.95)Chapter 4. Ambiguity Aversion, Equity Premium, and Business Cycles 117
where ^ e ￿ de. The variable v will be chosen (due to the envelope theorem) so that
V (w0
1) = V (w0
2), i.e., so that w0
1 = w0
2. That means that b = ￿bw and ^ e = 0 ￿the






1 ￿ ￿ + v
￿b(1 ￿ q￿b)
￿
(1 ￿ q￿b): (4.96)
This expression simpli￿es to
￿bq = ￿ (4.97)
and then consumption is given by
c = (1 ￿ ￿)w: (4.98)
Since
p
1+p = ￿ in the ￿ = 1 case, this implies
￿b = (￿ ￿ v)￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿ + v)￿2: (4.99)
Therefore,
v =











For ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 0:98 ￿1 = 1:02, and ￿2 = 1:01, ￿b =
2￿1￿2
￿1+￿2, and




A2 Proofs of subsection 5.3
We want to proof that
E(￿
0 j ￿) < ￿: (4.103)
Since
E(￿
0 j ￿) = ￿
￿(￿ ￿ v)
￿ ￿ ￿v
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿ + v)
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v





+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿ + v)







Since v 6= 0,
￿ < 1: (4.107)
And condition (4.107) is always true in the case we study, otherwise we would
be back to the case of one agent.





















+ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + v
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v
: (4.108)






+ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + v





+ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + v
1 ￿ ￿
= ￿ ￿ v + 1 ￿ ￿ + v = 1: (4.109)